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ARTICLE
OH, WHAT A TRUISM THE TENTH AMENDMENT IS:
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES *
Sharon E. Rush **

Abstract
The Supreme Court under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and now Chief
Justice Roberts takes the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty seriously. It
also takes the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity seriously.
Moreover, the contemporary Court’s interpretations of Congress’s Article I
powers are based on its concomitant interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, which the Court has infused with the idea that an inherent part
of a state’s sovereignty is not just its prerogative not to have its treasuries
invaded, but also includes its right not to have its dignity assaulted. Protecting
the dignity of states and other critical principles that inform the Court’s Article
I, Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence have made their
way into cases about Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Court’s strong coupling of state
sovereignty and state sovereign immunity suggests that they are an inseparable
part of the federalism balance.
This Article explores the development of the contemporary Court’s strong
emphasis on the importance of states as evidenced by its interpretations at the
intersection of Article I, the Tenth, the Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments
(the “Intersection”). When all is said and done, the path to obtaining damage
remedies against a state has been significantly blocked by developments at the
Intersection, notwithstanding Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5
to abrogate states’ immunity. Yet the adequacy of state remedies is largely
*
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irrelevant under § 1983, the primary statute that provides a cause of action for
alleged violations of federal law by state actors. Significantly, though, almost
all state constitutions protect the principle that “where there’s a right, there must
be a remedy.”
In light of this development, the Court’s message about the importance of
states under Article I, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, does not
include a concomitantly strong message about their importance under the
Fourteenth Amendment. To emphasize, this Article does not attempt to lay out
the contours of the role state remedies can and should play at the Intersection;
that is the focus of future scholarship. Rather, this Article explores the strength
and breadth of the Court’s message about the importance of states under Article
I, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and highlights the curious absence
of a concomitantly strong message about the importance of the states in
protecting individual rights and providing remedies for violations of those
rights. Certainly, if states are important under Article I, and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, they also are important under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Including a message about the importance of state remedies at the
Intersection bolsters the Court’s overall message about the importance of states
in the constitutional design.
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INTRODUCTION
“[W]ithout [the independent protective force of state law] . . . the full
realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.” 1
The Supreme Court under the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and now Chief
Justice Roberts takes the Tenth Amendment 2 and state sovereignty seriously. It
also takes the Eleventh Amendment 3 and state sovereign immunity seriously.
As this Article explores, the Court has infused the Eleventh Amendment with
Tenth Amendment principles. The contemporary Court’s strong coupling of
state sovereignty and state sovereign immunity suggests they are an inseparable
part of the federalism 4 balance. And while enjoying sovereign immunity is part
of a state’s sovereignty, it does not necessarily follow that because a state is
sovereign, it is always immune. Yet many of the contemporary Court’s
decisions protect state sovereignty—immunize states from the effects of federal
laws - in ways that extend beyond the traditional understanding of state
sovereign immunity that a state cannot be sued without its consent. 5 I refer to
this as the Shield.
Additionally, the contemporary Court fortifies the Shield by limiting
Congress’s power under Article I 6 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 Recent developments at the Intersection of Article I, the Tenth,
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
2. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. Professor Somin’s definition of federalism describes my use of the term and I respectfully
quote her: “I focus on constitutional federalism in the narrower sense of judicial enforcement of structural
limits on federal power, usually for the purpose of leaving greater scope for state and local authority.”
Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, 441, 442 (2016). How the
division of power should be balanced, of course, is persistently a subject of disagreement. See, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2010) (arguing for a view of federalism divorced from the constraints of sovereignty; a
“national federalism” that recognizes the interdependency of federal and state governments).
5. For an excellent history of sovereign immunity, see Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989).
6. I focus primarily on the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause: “The
Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
7.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
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the Eleventh, and the Fourteenth Amendments (the “Intersection”) send a
strong message about the importance of states in the constitutional design. 8
Simultaneously, the Shield creates a federal void (the “Void”) by making it
virtually impossible for individuals to obtain money damages from their states
under federal law for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 9 The
complexities surrounding efforts to obtain this remedy because of sovereign
immunity and state sovereignty principles is this Article’s primary focus. 10 It is
as if the Constitution can only protect state sovereignty or individual rights, or
as Professor Akhil Amar so eloquently asked years ago, “Is the Constitution
therefore divided against itself?” 11
This Article suggests that state remedies can provide a bridge over this
divide and that a critical scene in the bigger picture is largely missing: a
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws . . . Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. The Rehnquist and now Roberts Court is often characterized as the “federalism” Court. See
generally Somin, supra note 4. One of the most interesting conceptions of federalism that is receiving
attention is “national federalism,” which posits that federal/state relations are increasingly defined by
federal regulatory statutes. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996
(2014) (“Federalism today is something that mostly comes – and goes – at Congress’s pleasure. It is a
question, and feature, of federal statutory design.”). Id. at 1998. Notwithstanding the source of “our
national federalism,” and consistent with this Article’s theme, Professor Gluck also notes that it “depends
on, and strengthens, the states’ continuing sovereign status in important ways that have yet to be
recognized.” (footnote omitted). Id. at 2000.
9. Prominent scholars criticize this development. For an excellent history and critique of the
Court’s Section 5 cases, see generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015). See also Jack M.
Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010) (“Increasing congressional power at
the expense of the states was the whole point of the new constitutional structure that followed the Civil
War.”). Id. at 1809; Aviam Soifer, Of Swords, Shields, and a Gun to the Head: Coercing Individuals, but
not States, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2016) (describing the Rehnquist and Roberts’ Court view
of Congress’s enforcement power as “crabbed.”).
10. Individuals have other federal remedies available, most notably prospective injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), discussed infra Part II, enforcement actions brought by the
United States, and suits against individual state actors in their personal capacities and suits against local
governments. Obtaining those federal remedies also is becoming increasingly more difficult in light of
the Shield and the Void, but that exploration is beyond the scope of this Article. For a creative solution to
the growing inability of individuals to obtain money damages against their states, see James E. Pfander
& Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State Accountability, 102 VA. L. REV. 101 (2016) (suggesting
“a two-step process” for remedying unlawful state action: individuals first seek injunctive relief under
Young and then “pursue their claim [for money damages against the state] through whatever machinery
the state has established.”) Id. at 139. Their argument, of course, is premised on Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947), in which the Court held that the Supremacy Clause requires states to hear federal claims that
are analogous to the state claims they hear.
11. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987).
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message from the Court about the importance of state remedies. Occasionally,
the Court recognizes the existence of state remedies in Section 5 cases. 12 But
the adequacy of state remedies is largely irrelevant under § 1983, the primary
statute that provides a cause of action for alleged violations of federal law by
state actors. 13 Simultaneously, almost all state constitutions protect the
principle that “where there’s a right, there must be a remedy.” 14
To emphasize, this Article does not attempt to lay out the contours of the
role state remedies should play at the Intersection; that is the focus of future
scholarship. 15 Rather, this Article explores the strength and breadth of the
Court’s message about the importance of states under Article I, and the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments, and highlights the curious absence of a
concomitantly strong message about the importance of the states in protecting
individual rights and providing remedies for violations of those rights. To
invoke a cliché in the context of the importance of states: It is as if the Court
neglects the states’ forests (remedies) in its protection of the states’ trees
(sovereignty and immunity).
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the contemporary
Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as a substantively meaningful
representation of federalism principles, particularly with respect to Congress’s
Article I powers. As analyzed in Part II, the contemporary Court’s efforts to
12. For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Court held that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not abrogate states’ immunity, but Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, opined that “[s]tate employees are protected by state age
discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost every State
of the Union.” Id. at 91–92. The Court also considers state remedies in the context of evaluating whether
or not a state actor has violated due process. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Educ. Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (patent infringement by a state is not a due process violation if state
provides remedy). See also infra Part IV.
13. Infra Part IV (discussing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
14. For an excellent history of state remedies, see generally Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional
Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2003). The “rights/remedy” principle, of course, is famously
associated with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Interestingly, just because most states
recognize the principle does not mean that an individual will necessarily receive a remedy under state
law. See, e.g., Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 BOSTON U.
L. REV. 397, 429 (2018) (“No state court thinks its law guarantees a personal remedy for every legal
wrong. Rather, providing law for the redress of wrongs is a recognized state interest, even where
countervailing concerns may counsel withholding a remedy.”) (footnote omitted).
15. This Article is not suggesting that state remedies should be exhausted or even that they are
more important than federal remedies. The development about the scope of state remedies in light of the
Shield and the Void is the focus of future scholarship.
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define the boundaries between federal and state power eventually resulted in
merging Tenth Amendment state sovereignty principles with Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity principles. Moreover, the contemporary
Court’s interpretations of Congress’s Article I powers are based on its
concomitant interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, which the
Court has infused with the idea that an inherent part of a state’s sovereignty is
not just its prerogative not to have its treasuries invaded but also includes its
right not to have its dignity assaulted. 16 Consistent with protecting that
principle, the Court held that Congress does not have power under Article I to
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. 17
Part III focuses on the relationships among the states, individuals, and
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of this Part lies the
challenge of understanding the “congruence and proportionality” test (the
“Test”) in City of Boerne v. Flores. 18 As a brief overview, the Boerne Court
held that enforcement legislation must be congruent and proportional “to the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” 19
Although Congress cannot create Fourteenth Amendment rights, Boerne held
that Congress’s enforcement power does extend to imposing obligations on
states to prevent constitutional violations. This is what I call the “Boerne
inconsistency,” because preventive measures function a lot like “rights.”20
Unraveling the inconsistency and providing a way to understand other
complicated issues raised by the Test is the primary goal of this Part.
Part III demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation of Section 5 comports
with the Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment principles, particularly as
they relate to protecting states’ dignity. Indeed, protecting the dignity of states 21
and other critical principles that inform the Court’s Article I, Tenth Amendment
and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence have made their way into cases about
Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 5. This is dramatically
16. For an historical perspective on the role of “dignity” in American jurisprudence, see generally
Erin Daly, Human Dignity in the Roberts Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals,
and the Reluctant Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2011). Professor Daly suggests that
the law surrounding the dignity of states can be helpful in the development of a jurisprudence that protects
the dignity of individuals. The notion that states have dignity, particularly at the expense of individuals,
also is criticized. See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1255
(2016) (the prohibition on assaulting a state’s dignity suggests they are entitle[d] . . . to a kind of
unaccountability . . . .”); see generally Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
17. Infra Part II (discussing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)). But see Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (sovereign immunity does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings).
18. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
19. Id. at 508.
20. See infra Part III.
21. For an excellent critique of the idea that states are imbued with dignity and do not have to earn
it, see Jeremy M. Sher, A Question of Dignity: The Renewed Significance of James Wilson’s Writings on
Popular Sovereignty in the Wake of Alden v. Maine, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 591 (2005).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259988
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259988

2018]

OH, WHAT A TRUISM THE TENTH AMENDMENT IS

8

illustrated by the Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,22
which relied on the “equal sovereignty principle” to strike down the
preclearance coverage formula in § 4 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA).
The contemporary Court uses the analysis in the voting rights cases as a
baseline measurement to evaluate the need for Congress to use its enforcement
power in Section 5 cases, none of which raised the equal sovereignty principle.
This comparison alone makes it even less likely that enforcement legislation
will meet the Test because of the unique circumstances surrounding the voting
rights of African Americans in the 1960s. Thus, injecting the equal sovereignty
principle into the analysis is likely to narrow Congress’s enforcement power
and thereby fortify the Shield and the Void.
Simultaneously, when enforcement legislation fails abrogation, it generally
remains valid under Article I and the analysis circles back (the “Circling Back
Phenomenon”) to this complicated Intersection. Because Article I is not a
source of abrogation, however, money damages against states remain elusive
under federal law. Yet when state remedies exist, they mitigate the Void.
Fortunately, as explored in Part IV, state remedies are beginning to have a
presence at the Intersection, 23 and a message from the Court about their
importance would be a welcome addition to its overall message about the
importance of states in the constitutional design.
This Article concludes that when all is said and done, Congress’s
enforcement power is incredibly shallow, and is shrinking. 24 Unless Congress
takes a seriously more responsive role in exercising its enforcement power, the
people will have to rely increasingly on their states to help fill in the Void. The
challenge of acknowledging and addressing the Void, while also protecting
state sovereignty, should be an appealing one to scholars, especially to those
who accept Dean Heather Gerken’s challenge to adopt a more integrative
understanding of federal/state relations. 25 Certainly, sending a message about
the important positive role states can and should play under the Fourteenth
Amendment would be consistent with and even fortify the Court’s emphasis on
the importance of state sovereignty.
22. 570 U.S. 2 (2013).
23. Justice Kennedy focused on the availability of state remedies in his dissenting opinion in
Nevada v Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 751–52 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), discussed more fully infra Part
III. This is not to suggest that state remedies limit or even should limit Congress’s Section 5 power or that
states must provide remedies because that raises commandeering issues. See infra Part IV. State also must
abide by federal law under the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
24. This is particularly true after Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013) and
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30 (2012), analyzed infra Part III.B.4.
25. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1697, 1718 (2017)
(calling for a “détente between those in the nationalist and federalism camps,” and encouraging a robust
evaluation of how “Our Federalism” can be perfected to reflect today’s reality that the federal and state
governments are uniquely interrelated).
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I. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. From Chisholm v. Georgia 26 to the Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court struggled for over two centuries to answer the question
whether states retained their sovereign immunity when they adopted the
Constitution. Moreover, the primary path the Court has taken in its search for
the answer is the Eleventh Amendment. But what it means is anything but
obvious. On its face, it bars federal courts from hearing certain diversity suits
brought against a state. 27 It was adopted to overrule the Supreme Court’s 1793
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 28 in which the Court upheld its jurisdiction29
to hear a suit against Georgia for money damages and rejected Georgia’s
defense of sovereign immunity. 30
Chisholm was a surprise because sovereign immunity was a defense at
common law, as all of the Chisholm Justices acknowledged. Reacting swiftly
to overrule Chisholm, states quickly adopted the Eleventh Amendment in
1798—only five years later. Importantly, to say that the Eleventh Amendment
overruled Chisholm does not clarify whether the Amendment means that
Article III jurisdiction does not extend to diversity suits against states or
whether it means that states retained their common law immunity when the
Constitution was ratified. Scholars interpret Chisholm in different ways. 31 The
26. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
27. See supra note 3 (quoting Eleventh Amendment).
28. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
29. Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens
of another State.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress authorized such suits in the Judiciary Act of
1789. ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Interestingly, this Act granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over mandamus actions, which the Court in Marbury v. Madison held was an unconstitutional violation
of Article III. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Diversity jurisdiction is authorized
today under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
30. Georgia did not make an appearance but denied in a written response that the Court had
jurisdiction and argued that Article III’s language should be interpreted to mean only that states can sue
as plaintiffs but that they cannot be sued without their consent because they enjoy immunity. Chisholm,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419. See Massey, supra note 5 for a thorough and fascinating history of Chisholm. The
suit was filed initially in the circuit court in Georgia and it is unclear whether Justice Iredell, who was
riding circuit, dismissed that suit because he supported Georgia’s sovereign immunity defense or because
the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit courts. Id. at 99 n.196. In any event,
Chisholm then sued in the Supreme Court.
31. Professor Massey argues that the Eleventh Amendment was a response to a fear of what
Chisholm portended and not what it actually held because the Court never got to decide the immunity
question; it merely held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. When Georgia failed to make an
appearance, Chisholm moved for a default judgment but the Court gave Georgia almost a year to respond
and defend itself. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified and rendered the case moot so the
immunity question was never resolved. Massey, supra note 5, at 103. In contrast, Professor Amar takes
the position that the opinions of the Justices focused on whether an action of assumpsit would lie against
a state in federal court and the majority concluded that it would. In their opinions, not only did Article III
extend jurisdiction over states, but Professor Amar also notes that the Justices ignored the Rules Decision
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important point for this Article is that the Tenth Amendment supports either
interpretation, but none of the Chisholm Justices explicitly mention it, although
their opinions do dance in its shadows. 32 Ironically, Justice Iredell’s dissenting
opinion comes closest to invoking the Tenth Amendment: “The United states
are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered; each
State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved.” 33
Adding to the curious omission of any explicit reference to the Tenth
Act (part of the Judiciary Act of 1789) and fell into the Swift v. Tyson general federal common law hole
on the assumpsit question. Amar, supra note 11 at 1472 n.197.
32. The Justices presented their implicit references to the Tenth Amendment as follows: Justice
Blair,
When sovereigns are sued in their own Courts, such a method may have been established
as the most respectful form of demand; but we are not now in a State court, and if
sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other than the sovereign’s own courts, it
follows that when a state, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the
judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her right of
sovereignty.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 450 (Blair, J., concurring). In Justice Jay’s oblique reference to the Tenth
Amendment, he explicitly listed several powers that were surrendered to the federal government: “By
this great compact however, many prerogatives were transferred to the national government, such as
those of making war and peace, contracting alliances, coining money, etc. etc.” Id. at 471 (Jay, J.,
concurring). Significantly, the “etc. etc.” is his choice of language. In other words, his explicit list of
surrendered powers, and this assumes the critical diversity jurisdiction phrase in Article III would have
made the list, stops short of invoking the Tenth Amendment. Justice Wilson,
The question now opens fairly to our view, could the people of those states, among whom
were those of Georgia, bind those states, and Georgia among the others, by the
legislative, executive, and judicial power so vested? . . . If those states were the work of
those people, those people, and that I may apply the case closely, the people of Georgia,
in particular, could alter as they pleased their former work. To any given degree, they
could diminish as well as enlarge it. Any or all of the former state powers, they could
extinguish or transfer. The inference which necessarily results is that the Constitution
ordained and established by those people, and still closely to apply the case, in particular
by the people of Georgia, could vest jurisdiction or judicial power over those states and
over the State of Georgia in particular.
Id. at 454. And, Justice Cushing,
As to individual States and the United States, the Constitution marks the boundary of
powers. Whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people for their own
necessary security is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of States . . . So
that I think no argument of force can be taken from the sovereignty of States. Where it
has been abridged, it was thought necessary for the greater indispensable good of the
whole.
Id. at 466.
33. Id. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting). It is unclear whether Justice Iredell dissented because he
believed states retained their immunity or because he did not think the Judiciary Act authorized the suit.
See Massey, supra note 5, at 107–11.
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Amendment is the reality that the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution
only a few years prior to Chisholm, because the states feared that they were
surrendering too much power to the national government and adding the Bill of
Rights was the quid pro quo for some states’ agreements to ratify the
Constitution.34 Given that concern, especially when coupled with the Chisholm
question of whether states surrendered or retained their sovereign immunity,
the Tenth Amendment would have supported either conclusion. 35 So, whither
the Tenth Amendment?
B. The Importance of States and the Tenth Amendment
1. Article I: McCulloch v. Maryland 36
It might seem strange to focus on Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in
McCulloch because that case was about Congress’s power to create a national
bank and Maryland’s power to tax it and had nothing to do with sovereign
immunity. As Marshall laid out the boundaries between federal and state power,
however, he explicitly relied on the Tenth Amendment. Moreover, McCulloch
was decided only sixteen years after Chisholm and only eleven years after the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, and Marshall’s federalism boundaries
continue to influence, and even divide, Justices on the contemporary Court—
particularly with respect to Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5.
Marshall concluded that Congress had the power to create a national bank
and that Maryland did not have the power to tax it, and he emphasized that “we
must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.” 37 Accordingly,
Congress must have implied powers to carry out its explicit ones. Moreover,
Marshall opined that Congress’s power is even broader because of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which is not only not a limitation on Congress’s
power, but it is actually one of Congress’s enumerated powers. 38 In Marshall’s
opinion, the Necessary and Proper Clause is like icing on the congressional
power cake. Every first year law student learns Marshall’s famous statement:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
34. See generally KERMIT L. HALL, WILLIAM M. WIECEK & PAUL FINKELMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 94 (2d ed. 1996) (“To secure ratification in critical states like Virginia,
Federalists had to promise that they would propose such guarantees [for personal liberty] as amendments
to the Constitution.”).
35. Professor Massey and Professor Amar emphasized this as well. See Massey, supra note 5, at
66 (“The notion of state sovereign immunity . . . and its constitutional anchor are more properly found in
the Tenth Amendment.”) (footnote omitted); see Amar supra note 11, at 1491.
36. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
37. Id. at 407. Among Congress’s explicit powers that are related to creating a bank are the “great
powers,” including the powers “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to
declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies.” Id.
38. Id. at 420–21.
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means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are
Constitutional.”39
Notwithstanding his support for broad congressional power, Marshall
invoked the Tenth Amendment to acknowledge that the national government is
a government of limited powers and that some powers are reserved to the states.
One of the most critical points in his opinion is the distinction he made between
the states and the people. The Tenth Amendment also makes this distinction,
although very little attention is paid to the words “or the people respectively.”
This distinction explains why Maryland lacked the power to tax the bank.
Quoting Marshall:
The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own
authority or is introduced by its permission, but does it extend to those
means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers
conferred on that body by the people of the United States? We think it
demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are not given by the people
of a single State. They are given by the people of the United States, to a
Government whose laws, made in pursuance of the Constitution, are
declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State
cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them.” 40
Marshall’s distinction between the states and the people, citing the Tenth
Amendment, was the rationale for upholding the constitutionality of the
national bank and Maryland’s lack of power to tax it. More specifically,
McCulloch held that the people are the true sovereigns and that the states are
representatives of the people. The people of the United States delegated power
to Congress to create the bank, but they retained their sovereignty as a united
people and did not delegate to Maryland, a single state, the power to tax the
national bank. 41 This is consistent with Madison’s views that the liberty of the
people is best protected when governmental power is diffuse. 42
Interestingly, all of the Justices in Chisholm noted that the people are
sovereign but, again, without explicitly mentioning the Tenth Amendment.43
39. Id. at 421.
40. Id. at 429.
41. Professor Amar provides an excellent history of the tension (leading up to the Civil War)
between the Anti-Federalists and Republications, on one side, and the Federalists on the other side, over
the question about who was sovereign under the new Constitution. Was each state an independent
sovereign, the position of the Anti-Federalists? Or were the people of the United States the sovereign and
the states their representatives, the position of the Federalists? Amar, supra note 11, at 1452.
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). The diffusion of power between the national
government and the states is a distinguishing feature of the Constitution compared to the Articles of
Confederation.
43. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
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This analysis is relevant to state sovereign immunity and the Tenth Amendment
because the Justices on the Court today are divided on the question whether
Congress’s power under Section 5 is plenary as decided in McCulloch, or
whether it is remedial, a more limited standard. Also, the distinction between
the states and the people plays a vital role in understanding how the Test
functions and the limitations on Congress’s Section 5 powers and this is
explored in Part III below.
Finally, McCulloch adds significant insights into Marshall’s view about the
importance of states in the constitutional design—at least with respect to the
relationship between Congress and the states under Article I. Interestingly, he
also acknowledged that “the question respecting the extent of the powers
actually granted is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise so
long as our system shall exist.” 44 In other words, he suggested that the Tenth
Amendment is a truism and that the “truth” will continue to perpetually evolve.
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch can be interpreted to mean that states are not
that important because the people are the true sovereigns and they gave
Congress broad Article I power.
This seemingly rapid descent of the importance of states and state
sovereignty within a relatively short time after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment—which was an emphatic response to the “outrageous assault” on
Georgia’s sovereignty in Chisholm—is curious. Within a span of approximately
15 critical years because the Court was called upon to interpret significant parts
of the Constitution for the first time, the concept of state sovereignty became
clouded with confusion. How could state sovereignty, including its immunity,
be so important that the Eleventh Amendment was thought necessary to protect
it, but seemingly not so important with respect to defining the scope of
Congress’s Article I powers? Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore 45 offers interesting
insights.
2. The Bill of Rights: Barron
In Barron, the plaintiff sued Baltimore alleging that the city 46 failed to
maintain the water system which resulted in damage to his wharfs. He alleged
that this was an unconstitutional “takings” under the Fifth Amendment.47
44. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
45. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
46. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
cities are “persons” under § 1983 and can be sued for money damages but only when local state actors act
pursuant to an invalid policy. Id. Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that
Congress did not intend for cities to be sued under § 1983 because they enjoyed sovereign immunity.
47. Note, Reconciling State Sovereign Immunity with the Fourteenth Amendment, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1068 (2016) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing and abrogates states’
immunity for “takings” and tax refund cases).
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Ironically, Baltimore had consented to being sued so the issue of immunity was
moot. Still, Barron lost. Rationalizing that the Bill of Rights did not apply to
the states, the Court had no choice but to conclude that Barron was not stating
a cause of action under the Constitution.48
Several notable aspects of Barron are worth highlighting. First, and perhaps
most obviously, Barron is an acknowledgement about the importance of states
in the constitutional design. In fact, it might be one of the Court’s most
“emphatic” expressions 49 of just how important states are because they were
entrusted with protecting individual rights. The most important rights were
those that were included in the Bill of Rights because the people wanted to be
sure those rights were protected from violation by the federal government. But
the people (excluding the slaves, of course) did not have to fear that their own
state governments would violate such important rights. By not applying the Bill
of Rights to limit state power, the Court affirmed that the people could in fact
trust their states not to violate their rights.
Viewing McCulloch and Barron with hindsight is informative. In the bigger
picture, McCulloch downplayed the importance of states with respect to
Congress’s Article I power but Barron emphasized the importance of states
with respect to protecting individual rights. And these messages emanated from
Chief Justice Marshall within a relative short historical time period that
included Chisholm, adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, and Marbury v.
Madison. 50 Together, the messages provide a map for understanding where
Marshall thought the boundaries between national and state power should be
and in significant ways that map is charting the contemporary Court’s
federalism path.
Poignantly, and supportive of this Article’s theme, Marshall’s messages in
McCulloch and Barron echo with remarkable similarity those from the
contemporary Court but with two significant exceptions. As explored below in
Part (C), the messages are the same with respect to acknowledging that
Congress’s power is plenary under Article I. Unlike Marshall, however, the
contemporary Court limits Congress’s plenary power by articulating and
relying on Tenth Amendment principles. Its primary message is to reestablish
and reaffirm the importance of states in the constitutional design, including
under Article I. The contemporary Court’s revival of the Tenth Amendment is
48. It gets even more complicated in light of contemporary jurisprudence. For example, cities are
not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Further, suppose that the Bill of
Rights had applied to the states at the time of Barron in 1833—before the Fourteenth Amendment and §
1983 and even § 1331’s general arising under jurisdiction enacted in 1875. Barron still would have needed
a cause of action, raising questions about implied right of actions under the Constitution, which are beyond
the scope of this Article.
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”).
50. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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huge as evidenced by the strength of the Shield.
The second exception stands in sharp contrast. Unlike the Barron Court, the
contemporary Court is not sending a correspondingly loud message about the
importance of states in protecting individual liberties. Admittedly, federal/state
relations dramatically changed following the Civil War and adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments, and the Court post-Barron has incorporated most
of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states. 51 Even the contemporary Court
recently incorporated the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms. 52 But the
Court’s fierce respect for the Shield and seeming disregard for the Void raises
the question whether the Court is functioning as if federal/state relations are
returning to a Barron-like time in the sense that states can be trusted again. 53 If
so, then more can and should be expected of states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. If states do provide remedies and mitigate the federal remedy
Void, then failing to recognize their efforts to fulfill the Marbury rights/remedy
principle, 54 which recall most states also have in their own constitutions, is a
missed opportunity for the contemporary Court to strengthen its message about
the importance of states and state sovereignty.
C. The Tenth Amendment
1. It is a Truism
Chief Justice Marshall’s suggestion in McCulloch that the Tenth
Amendment is a “truism” is significant because of the context in which he and
subsequent Courts use that description. In McCulloch, to highlight, Marshall
did not invoke the Tenth Amendment as a reminder that federal power is
limited; he noted that the Constitution’s interpretation “depend[ed] on a fair
construction of the whole instrument.” 55 In context, his admonition augurs in
favor of reading the Constitution to give Congress broad power. He opined that
unless Congress legislates under a pretext, 56 its power is essentially unlimited.
Since McCulloch, different Courts interpreted the scope of Congress’s
power differently, particularly its Commerce Clause power, one of the most
51.
52.
53.
54.

See infra notes 296–98.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
See infra Part III.B.4.a.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who considers
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

Id.
55. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
56. Id. at 423.
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important clauses defining federalism boundaries. By manipulating the
definition of commerce (excluding mining, 57 manufacturing, 58 for example),
different Courts operated on the premise that Congress’s Commerce Clause
power and states retained powers under the Tenth Amendment were inversely
related. 59
The phrase, “the Tenth Amendment is a truism,” was used in McCulloch to
justify broad congressional power. Interestingly, it was used in United States v.
Darby, 60 decided in 1941, for the same purpose—to justify reestablishing the
broad scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power compared to the previous
Court. 61 In upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act,62
which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods that were
manufactured by workers in violation of the Act’s minimum wage and
maximum hours provisions, the Darby Court held that Congress’s Commerce
Clause power is plenary and “[f]rom the beginning and for many years the
[tenth] amendment has been construed as not depriving the national
government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted
power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.” 63
The Darby Court cited Gibbons v. Ogden, 64 the case in which Chief Justice
Marshall first described Congress’s broad Commerce Clause Power and held
that it extends to activities within a state that affect another state. 65 In light of
Darby, Wickard v. Fillburn 66 perhaps came as no surprise. Everyone familiar
with Wickard knows that the Court held that Congress had the power to impose
a penalty on farmers who grew wheat in excess of their allotments under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 67 This was true even though farmer
Filburn used his excess wheat to feed his family and his livestock. 68 It did not
matter. The Court held: “But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
57. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (coal mining not in commerce).
58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (antitrust laws do not extend to sugar
company because commerce does not include the manufacturing of sugar).
59. Interestingly, this same conception of the relationship between Congress and the states existed
under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. Specifically, the idea that federal power is “carved out of”
power that was reserved to the states comes from Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). Infra Part
III (exploring this power).
60. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
61. Specifically, in Darby, the Supreme Court explicitly referred to the Tenth Amendment as a
truism because it is “declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments.” Id. at
462.
62. Id. at 454–55.
63. Id. at 462.
64. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
65. Id. at 30.
66. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
67. Id. at 114 (his allotment was 11.1 acres, but he farmed 23 acres).
68. Id.
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by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.” 69 To emphasize just how broad Congress’s power extended, the
Court added: “That [Filburn’s] own contribution to the demand for wheat
maybe trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situation, is far from trivial.” 70
Critically, for the McCulloch and Darby Courts to label the Tenth
Amendment a “truism,” says nothing about what “truth” it represents. Those
Courts invoked the saying to suggest that state power is not very significant,
enabling the Courts to “dismiss” the importance of states under Article I in
finding the “true” federalism balance.
2. Oh, What a Truism It Is
In contrast, the contemporary Court has developed an understanding of the
limited nature of Congress’s Article I powers such that the idea that states have
reserved powers is meaningful. To the contemporary Court, the Tenth
Amendment commands the respect of the states. To highlight this shift in the
search for the “truth” behind the Tenth Amendment, I like this phrase: “The
Tenth Amendment is a truism, but, oh, what a truism it is.”
Unlike earlier Courts that limited Congress’s power by narrowing the
definition of commerce, the contemporary Court adopted the same definition
of commerce used in Wickard: Congress has the power to regulate the channels
of interstate commerce, persons and things in interstate commerce, and activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court also functions on an
extremely broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. For
example, in Comstock v. United States, 71 the Court upheld Congress’s power
to civilly commit certain sexual offenders after they had already served their
federal sentences.
Notwithstanding the broad scope of Congress’s Article I power, the
contemporary Court limited Congress’s power in three ways. First, it invoked
the anti-commandeering principle embodied in the Tenth Amendment as a
structural limitation on federal power. Second, it provided limiting principles
to the broad definition of commerce, particularly with respect to the
“substantially affects” prong of that definition. Finally, by building on those
two limitations of Congress’s power, the Court definitively answered “yes” to
the lingering question whether states retained their sovereign immunity when
they adopted the Constitution. As developed below, the Court’s three-way
attacks on Congress’s broad power under Article I are closely related, but also
69. Id. at 125.
70. Id. at 127–28.
71. 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
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significantly different. Bottom line, though, they work together to fortify the
Shield and lay the groundwork for limiting Congress under Section 5.
a. The Anti-Commandeering Principle 72
This principle provided the core rationale in three Tenth Amendment cases
that required states to follow Congress’s directives as provided in federal
statutes: New York v. United States, 73 Printz v. United States, 74 and National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 75 In New York, states had to
take title to radioactive waste materials they could not dispose of at dump
sites. 76 In Printz, state law enforcement personnel had to conduct background
checks on gun purchasers until the underlying federal regulatory program could
be staffed with federal officials. 77 In Sebelius, states were required to expand
their Medicaid coverage or lose federal funding for existing Medicaid
programs. 78
In all three cases, the Court emphasized the Constitution’s structural
limitations on Congress’s power, as symbolized by the Tenth Amendment.
Specifically, the New York Court held: “While Congress has substantial powers
to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the
States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.” 79
The Court cited to Darby for the proposition that the Tenth Amendment is
a truism, but notice that the Court invoked the phrase in the sense of “Oh, what
a truism it is.” The “truth” the contemporary Court relies on is that the Tenth
Amendment protects states under the “anti-commandeering principle,” which
prohibits the federal government from compelling states to administer federal
regulatory programs. 80 The Printz Court added illustrative Tenth Amendment
language:

72. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
73. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
74. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
75. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
76. New York, 505 U.S. at 926.
77. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902 (In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by passing
the Brady Act, which required the Attorney General to create a national background check system for gun
purchasers. While the federal program was being put into place, the Act required state and local law
enforcement to conduct the background checks. Several states objected to this requirement and challenged
Congress’s power.).
78. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 548. It also required individuals to purchase health insurance under the
Individual Mandate provisions. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
79. New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
80. Id. at 188. The Court cited to the Federalist No. 39, which states that the Constitution “leaves
to several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty . . .”
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Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the
Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers,
but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was
rendered express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 81
Compared to the previous Court, the contemporary Court was quickly turning
the “dismissive” truism into the “respectful” truism.
The Court’s second primary message supporting state sovereignty harkens
back to one of the critical aspects of understanding the scope of state sovereign
immunity; distinguishing between the states and the people. Specifically, the
New York Court reiterated, drawing on the Framers’ intent as evidenced in the
Federalist Papers, the established principle that the federal government has
power to regulate individuals but not states.
In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the Framers
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to
regulate individuals, not States…We have always understood that even
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel
the States to require or prohibit those acts. 82
Notably, the Printz Court protected state sovereignty and simultaneously
cited to Hamilton, stressing the importance of distinguishing between the states
and the people and the shared power the states and the federal governments
have over the people: “framers rejected the concept of a central government
that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in
which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority
over the people—who were, in Hamilton’s words, ‘the only proper objects of
government.’” 83
New York and Printz are powerful states’ rights case because there is no
question that the radioactive waste or the guns were in commerce—under a
definition as broad as that used in Wickard 84— and still the Court limited
Congress’s power and gave substantive meaning to the Tenth Amendment.
Indeed, the anti-commandeering principle carried the day in Sebelius, the more
recent case about the constitutionality of the Affordable Health Care Act
(AHCA).
Although Sebelius is a little bit different from New York and Printz, it adds
81.
82.
83.
84.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 919 (footnote omitted).
New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 109).
Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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a walloping boost to state sovereignty. Sebelius presented two issues: whether
Congress has the Commerce Clause power to require individuals to buy health
insurance (the “Individual Mandate”) and whether Congress has the power to
require states to expand Medicaid or lose existing federal funding (the
“Medicaid Expansion”). I explore the Individual Mandate provision below, but
note here that the Court held that it violated the Commerce Clause but not the
Taxing and Spending Clause. 85 The important point here is that the Court held
that the Medicaid Expansion is unconstitutional because it violates the anticommandeering principle. 86 Moreover, the Court cited to both New York and
Printz in support of its holding. 87 In fact, the language Chief Justice Roberts
used in Sebelius dramatically makes the point that Congress cannot coerce
states to participate in federal regulatory programs by “putting a gun to their
heads.” 88 It is hard to imagine a more vivid and dramatic visualization of an
“assault.”
b. The “Substantially Affects” Prong of Commerce
The second method of protecting state sovereignty by limiting Congress’s
Article I powers focuses on the “substantially affects interstate commerce”
prong of the broad definition of commerce. United States v. Lopez 89 provides a
solid starting point to begin the analysis. In Lopez, the Court addressed the
question whether Congress has the power to make possession of guns near
schools a federal crime. 90 Critically, the Lopez Court affirmed that the correct
definition of commerce is the same one used in Darby. To be within Congress’s
Commerce Clause power, then, the law had to regulate an activity that has a
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce. At this juncture in its opinion, the
Court highlighted that possession of a gun is not even economic activity. 91 And
while the Court noted that it was not necessary for Congress to present evidence
that Lopez’s gun actually had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the
absence of such evidence was noteworthy to the Court. 92
The highlighted words or phrases identify critical issues that divide the
Justices even today. Ironically, it was not until Sebelius that the idea that
Congress could only regulate an “activity” became crystal clear. This, of
85. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012).
86. Id. at 523.
87. Id. at 559.
88. Id. at 522–23.
89. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
90. Id. at 551. (The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 at 18 U.S.C. §922(q) made it a federal
crime to knowingly . . . possess a firearm near a school).
91. Id. at 562. Moreover, the law was not even limited to a subset of guns that have some
connection to interstate commerce.
92. Id. at 563.
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course, arose in the context of the Individual Mandate and the requirement that
a person has to buy health insurance under the AHCA or face a penalty. 93 Chief
Justice Roberts emphasized that Congress’s power to regulate commerce only
extends to “activities” and not buying health insurance is inactivity and,
therefore, not even in commerce. 94
Prior to Sebelius, the cases the Court reviewed in this area focused on the
other two highlighted phrases: “economic activity” and “actually in
commerce.” For example, in United States v. Morrison, 95 the Court held that
Congress does not have power under Article I to provide a civil remedy for
women who are the victims of violence because, among other reasons,
committing acts of violence is not “economic activity.” 96 Moreover, it is clear
following Sebelius that to meet the “substantially affects” prong of the
definition of commerce, the federal law must regulate economic activity.
c. The “Actual Evidence” Prong of Commerce
As for the “actual evidence” issue, the law remains uncertain and the
Justices are split on what standard to apply. Does Congress need actual
evidence that the economic activity substantially affects commerce?
Alternatively, is it sufficient that Congress has a rational basis for concluding
that an economic activity substantially affects commerce? If actual evidence is
required, Congress’s power is more limited and the Court plays a larger role in
limiting Congress’s power. Presumably, a federalism Court would prefer this.
On the other hand, if the standard is that Congress simply needs a rational basis
for concluding that an economic activity substantially affects commerce, then
there is little need for the Court to review Commerce Clause legislation to see
if it meets the test. 97
This issue marked the turning point for the different outcomes in Lopez and
Gonzales v. Raich. 98 In Raich, the Court upheld Congress’s power to make
possession of medical marijuana a crime. 99 In Lopez, the Court was concerned
about the absence of congressional findings that possession of guns in school
zones actually had a substantial effect on interstate commerce because that
conclusion “was not visible to the naked eye.” 100 In their concurring opinion,
93. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519.
94. Id. at 558–59.
95. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
96. Id. at 598–99 (striking down the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)). Congress also
lacked power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide a civil remedy for domestic
violence victims who are harmed by private people. Id. at 622. See also infra Part III and Part IV.B.
97. This issue also arises in the context of Congress’s Section 5 power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra Part III.B.3.
98. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
99. Id. at 57.
100. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
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Justices Kennedy and O’Connor emphasize that the Court has a responsibility
to ensure that Congress respects two more essential postulates about state
sovereignty: (1) that states are supposed to be laboratories for experimenting
with their own ideas about what should be regulated and how it should be
regulated, and 40 states already criminalized possession of guns near
schools, 101 and, (2) there are areas of traditional state concern, like education,
that are reserved for the states to regulate. 102 Note how the “labs of
experimentation” and “areas of traditional state concern” principles fit neatly
into Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and are articulable standards for defining
the boundary between national and state power.
This issue about whether Congress needs “actual” evidence also is at the
heart of the dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and
Ginsburg in Lopez. In fact, Justices Breyer’s dissent cites to studies that present
empirical evidence about the effects of guns in schools on interstate
commerce. 103 But the important point all of the dissenting Justices highlight is
the limited role the Court should play in evaluating the constitutionality of the
federal law. All that is required for the law to be constitutional, in their
opinions, is that it was rational for Congress to conclude that possession of guns
nears schools has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 104
The Raich majority (the Lopez dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and
Scalia) concluded that the regulation of drugs is “quintessentially economic
activity.” 105 But, unlike in Lopez, the Raich majority found that Congress had
a rational basis for concluding that possession of medical marijuana has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce and emphasized the Court’s limited
role: “[W]e stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine
whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so
concluding.” 106
Teaching Lopez and Raich is challenging because it is not easy to
understand the different outcomes. 107 First, the Court uses the same broad
101. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., & O’Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 583.
103. Id. at 564–68 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
104. Id. at 565; id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
106. Id. at 33. Interestingly, Justice Scalia concurred to provide the sixth vote to uphold the law. In
his concurrence, he also relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause and even opined that Congress’s power
extends to the regulation of non-economic intrastate activity if not regulating it would undercut a national
market. Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). He also has unique views about the scope of Congress’s Section
5 powers, discussed infra Part III.
107. I distinctly remember asking my Constitutional Law class in 1995 when we studied Lopez: Do
you think the Court would rule the same way if Lopez violated a federal law that made it a crime to
possess marijuana? The buzz around the room suggested that I had asked a silly question. After all,
possession is possession; it does not matter what is possessed. Of course, I felt the same way, but I also

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259988
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259988

2018]

OH, WHAT A TRUISM THE TENTH AMENDMENT IS

23

definition of commerce in both cases. 108 It cites to Wickard and Darby with
approval in both cases. 109 The outcomes are different, however, because of this
open issue about what the standard is that controls the “substantially affects”
prong. Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined the majority in Raich for a relatively
rare 6–3 vote in cases in this area. As explored in Part III, the scope of
Congress’s Article I power engenders a similar disagreement in the Section 5
cases and also is vital to the effect of federal laws that Circle Back to the
Intersection because they fail under the Fourteenth Amendment. If such laws
are valid under Article I, then at least states can be held to federal standards.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY AND TENTH AMENDMENT
STATE SOVEREIGNTY MERGE
Around the time of New York, Printz, and Lopez, the Court also decided
Seminole Tribe v. Florida 110 and Alden v. Maine. 111 In fact, these cases were
all decided within seven years of each other, with Morrison, Comstock, and
Raich right on their heels. Seminole Tribe and Alden join the state sovereignty
revival in perhaps one of the most significant ways: they clarify the meaning of
the Eleventh Amendment by relying on Tenth Amendment principles.
To appreciate the full import of Seminole Tribe and Alden, however, it is
important to include Hans v. Louisiana 112 and Ex parte Young. 113 Decided
almost a century after Chisholm, the Hans Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment also bars federal-question suits against non-consenting states in
federal court. At the time of Chisholm and the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, there is logic in the observation that the Eleventh Amendment
was intended to bar diversity suits because it was “correcting” Chisholm’s error
and also because general arising under jurisdiction did not exist until 1875. 114
Nevertheless, despite its literal language, the Hans Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment represents the principle of sovereign immunity embedded in the
common law prior to adoption of the Constitution.115
Hans added to the confusion left in the wake of Chisholm and the wording
of the Eleventh Amendment because it did not answer the question whether the
Amendment restored common law immunity or whether it established a subject
thought the question was kind of silly because I never imagined the Court would grant cert in such a case.
108. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; Raich, 545 U.S. at 16, 17.
109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556; Raich, 545 U.S. at 9, 17–20.
110. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
111. 527 U.S. 710 (1999).
112. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
113. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
114. Hans, 134 U.S. at 4.
115. Id. at 18.
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matter jurisdiction bar—to just diversity suits or even to federal question
suits. 116 Depending on the answer, Congress’s power would be affected; a
common law rule invited Congress to possibly abrogate a state’s immunity,
whereas a subject matter jurisdiction bar meant that Congress could not open
the Article III gates through ordinary legislation. 117
The Hans Court’s reasoning that state sovereign immunity is an essential
ingredient of state sovereignty laid the perfect foundation for the contemporary
Court’s decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden. Focusing on Seminole Tribe,
the case raised the question whether Congress has the power under Article I’s
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity, which
Congress clearly intended to do in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 118 The
case arose because the Seminole Tribe sued Florida in federal court when its
Governor refused to negotiate with the Tribe as required by the Act. 119 Florida
successfully raised the defense of sovereign immunity. 120
The Court held in a 5–4 decision that Congress lacks abrogation power
under the Indian Commerce Clause, and in its reasoning, the Court reviewed
the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 121 in which that Court held
that Congress does have abrogation power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause in Article I. 122 By considering both Article I Clauses in its opinion, the
Seminole Tribe Court relied on the sovereign immunity principle embedded in
Hans to declare that Congress does not power under either Clause to abrogate
a state’s sovereign immunity. 123 Significantly, the Court affirmed that the
Amendment does not mean what it says: “Although the text of the Amendment
would appear to restrict only Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” 124
What is that presupposition? It is that states are sovereign and that an
“inherent” part of their sovereignty is their immunity from suit without their

116. Professor William Baude recently presented a persuasive argument that sovereign immunity is
a special common law rule that is part of the constitutional backdrop such that it cannot be changed. From
this view, Hans was correctly decided. See Wiliam Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional
Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017). See also William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989).
117. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).
118. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
119. Id. at 51.
120. Id. at 47.
121. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68–70. But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006)
(sovereign immunity does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings).
124. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (citing Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779
(1991)).
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consent. 125
Critically important, the Seminole Tribe Court left no doubt that states
retained their immunity when they ratified the Constitution. Relying on Hans,
the Court said, “For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction
over suits against unconsenting states ‘was not contemplated by the
Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.’” 126 To
phrase more poignantly, at long last, the contemporary Court clarified that the
Eleventh Amendment presents a constitutional bar to suits against nonconsenting states in federal court and Congress cannot alter that using its
Article I powers, citing Marbury. 127 Accordingly, it overruled Union Gas and
held that Florida enjoyed immunity from suit. 128
Seminole Tribe is significant for another critical issue and here it is time to
introduce Ex parte Young, 129 decided in 1908. In Young, Minnesota enacted a
law regulating railroad rates that a federal court ruled was unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoined Young, Minnesota Attorney
General, from enforcing the law. 130 Undeterred, Young sought relief in state
court and the federal court held him in contempt. 131
In Young, the Supreme Court faced a challenging question: If Young was
essentially the state of Minnesota and therefore enjoyed immunity, how was
the supremacy of federal going to be protected? Cleverly, the Court held that
Young acted without state authority when he tried to enforce an
unconstitutional law and therefore was not the state and did not enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 132 Simultaneously, the Court held that he was a state
actor, albeit acting unlawfully, for purposes of the state action doctrine under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 133 This opening enabled the Court to allow
prospective injunctive relief against Young and against state actors more
generally. 134 The availability of Young relief respects the Eleventh Amendment
and also the Fourteenth Amendment by enabling courts to protect the
supremacy of federal law by enjoining state actors from continuing to violate
federal law. Young relief also plays a pivotal role in the Circling Back
Phenomenon as a way to hold states to federal standards when abrogation fails
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
When Florida’s Governor did not negotiate with the Seminole Tribe, it
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. (citing Hans).
Id. at 65. (citing Marbury).
Id. at 66.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 126, 172. The Supreme Court reviewed his writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154; infra Part III.A (discussing state action doctrine).
Young, 209 U.S. at 131–32.
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sought to enjoin him under Young. 135 The Court, however, held that Young
relief was unavailable because Congress had provided a comprehensive
remedial scheme in the Act and had not listed injunctive relief among the
possible remedies. 136 This is important because the Young doctrine was
established almost 90 years earlier and it would have been reasonable to
presume it was available because Congress did not exclude it. Instead, the Court
presumed that Congress intended for it to be unavailable by not including it.
Arguably, this protects separation of powers principles, but, more significantly,
it strengthens the Shield. 137
Interestingly, the Seminole Tribe Court does not explicitly rely on the Tenth
Amendment, but it fits perfectly into the contemporary Court’s Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. This becomes crystal clear in Alden, decided only
three years later, because Alden raised the same question the Court decided in
Seminole Tribe: whether Congress has the power to abrogate a state’s sovereign
immunity using its Article I powers. Significantly, though, Alden was a suit in
state court against Maine to recover wages allegedly due to state probation
officers under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 138 The Eleventh
Amendment, on its face, does not apply in state court. Moreover, even the
decision in Seminole Tribe interpreted the Amendment as a complete subject
matter jurisdiction bar to suits for money damages against non-consenting
states by private parties in federal court. 139
Given the contemporary Court’s coupling of state sovereignty principles
embedded in the Tenth Amendment with the principle of state sovereign
immunity embedded in the Eleventh Amendment, it is not surprising that the
Alden Court applied those Tenth Amendment principles to protect Maine from
the suit in its own courts. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion explicitly rests
on the Tenth Amendment:
We have, as a result, sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from
suit as “Eleventh Amendment immunity.” The phrase is . . . something
of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives
from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather,
135. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51–53.
136. Id. at 53–54, 74.
137. For a critique of Seminole Tribe’s holding on the Young relief issue, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 495 (1997). Significantly, the Court held in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89 (1984), that state officials cannot be enjoined in federal court on state law issues.
138. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 710, 711–12 (1999). The suit was originally filed in federal court,
but when Seminole Tribe was handed down, the federal court dismissed it because Maine enjoyed
sovereign immunity and Congress lacked the power to abrogate it. Hopeful, the Alden plaintiffs filed their
suit in Maine state court. Id. at 712. Recall that the Darby Court upheld Congress’s Commerce Clause
power to enact the FLSA. See supra Part I.C.1.
139. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 45, 68 (1996).
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as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative
interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit
is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today
(either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an
equal footing with the other States) 140
except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments . . .” 141
Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign
entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment . . .” 142
Alden follows logically from the contemporary Court’s Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence and the opinion is infused with reliance on and
citations to principles at the heart of those decisions, particularly Seminole
Tribe. 143 States’ immunity from money damages not only protects their coffers
(the traditional understanding of immunity), but it also protects their
independent policy decision-making (dignity). 144 The Alden Court even
intimates that allowing suits under federal law (enacted under Article I, at least)
for money damages against states—in either federal or state courts—without
their consent, would violate the anti-commandeering principle, 145 and
explicitly suggests it would confuse political accountability lines, 146 much like
the take-title provision of the federal law in New York, 147 and the background
check provision in Printz—two Tenth Amendment bulwark cases. 148
But the Alden Court was not just concerned about protecting states’ coffers.
Its opinion emphasizes that states enjoy a constitutional immunity from having
their dignity assaulted. The Court opined, “[O]ur federalism requires that
Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary
sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.” 149 The
rhetoric the Court associates with protecting a state’s dignity is akin to the
140. Notice that this is the original understanding of the principle of equal sovereignty among the
states, which is different from the way in which Shelby County used it. See infra Part III.B.4.a.
141. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 739–40 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.15).
144. Id. at 750.
145. Id. at 749.
146. Id. at 750.
147. Id. at 714. The Founders adopted “ʻa system in which the State and Federal Governments would
exercise concurrent authority over the people . . .’” (quoting the Federalist No. 15; referring to New York
v. United States, 505 U.S.144 (1992)).
148. Id. at 751–52; see also supra Part I.C.2.
149. Id. at 748.
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choice of words one might use when an individual’s dignity is impugned. For
example, the Court held that subjecting a non-consenting state to suit for money
damages is “[not] becoming,” 150 is “offensive,” 151 is “denigrating,” 152 and, of
course, is “disrespectful” of a state’s inherent sovereignty. 153
Finally, a significant portion of the majority’s opinion is devoted to refuting
Justice Souter’s dissent because he continued to rely on the diversity
jurisdiction interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 154 It is as if the majority
is signaling that they are tired of talking about what the Eleventh Amendment
means and are ready to “put to bed” any lingering questions about the scope of
state sovereignty, 155 especially with respect to state sovereign immunity and
the full scope of how the constitution’s history and structure protect states, not
just from monetary judgments against their will, but, quite significantly, also
from assaults to their dignity in the constitutional design.
To briefly summarize, the contemporary Court protects states and their
sovereignty from the effects of federal law in ways that extend beyond the
traditional understanding of sovereign immunity. This is apparent from the
Court’s focus on protecting states’ dignity in a broad sense that extends beyond
protecting their treasuries. With the merger of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, the Shield is securely in place and ready to protect states from a
coercive or disrespectful Congress. Notably, the Court relies on Alden in almost
all of the Section 5 cases discussed below even though those cases were filed
in federal court. Such reliance is evidence that the Court intends to infuse the
Section 5 cases with the basic sovereignty and immunity principles that led up
to and supported its decision in Alden.
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CONGRESS, STATES, AND INDIVIDUALS
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individual rights and explicitly limits
150. Id.
151. Id. at 749.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 748–49 (“The principle of sovereign immunity preserved by constitutional design ‘thus
accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation.’”) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). For a comprehensive critical analysis
of the value of dignity-based claims of individuals, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The
Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLORIDA L. REV. 1 (2017).
154. Alden, 527 U.S. at 793–94 n.29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer).
155. The Court also seems to be tired of this battle in the context of sovereign immunity and
Congress’s abrogation power under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2002), Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, opined: “Indeed, the present
dissenters’ refusal to accept the validity and natural import of decisions like Hans, rendered over a full
century ago by this Court, makes it difficult to engage in additional meaningful debate on the place of
state sovereign immunity in the Constitution.” Id. at 79–80. See also infra Part IV.B.
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state power. Section 1 provides that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. 156
Congress has power under Section 5 to enforce the Amendment through
“appropriate legislation.” 157 Before analyzing some of the confusing issues
raised by Section 5, two significant issues are clear. First, in 1976 in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 158 a unanimous Court 159 held that Section 5 is a source of
abrogation. 160 Second, the Fitzpatrick Court also held that Congress’s
enforcement power diminished what had previously been reserved to the states
and that “[s]uch enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty.” 161 The
Fitzpatrick Court relied on a line of cases beginning in 1880 with Ex parte
Virginia, 162 which even the contemporary Court continues to cite with
approval. 163 Notwithstanding this simple “truth,” however, Congress’s
enforcement power is incredibly shallow and arguably is shrinking, as explored
below. However, this development is consistent with the “oh, what a truism it
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
157. Supra note 7 (Fourteenth Amendment).
158. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 successfully abrogated a state’s
sovereign immunity when a male plaintiff sued Connecticut for money damages alleging that his
employer discriminated against him on the basis of sex).
159. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion but he was not elevated to Chief Justice until 1986 and
Fitzpatrick was decided in 1976.
160. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457.
161. Id. at 454–55 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)). Professor Azaira raises the
question whether the anti-commandeering principle would limit Congress’s enforcement power and
suggests it would not, pointing out the significant intrusion into state sovereignty under the VRA. AZAIRA,
supra note 9, at 4. I think requiring states to provide remedies would violate the anti-commandeering
principle, which became prominent at the Intersection after New York, Printz, and Sebelius and also Shelby
County. Subjecting states to potential money damages under federal law is different from “forcing” states
to provide remedial schemes. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor note this distinction in their concurring
opinion in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001). See infra Part
III.B.3.c (giving a fuller discussion of Garrett).
162. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (explaining a line of cases dating from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
at 339 to Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)). Id. opining:
There can be no doubt that this line of cases has sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting
under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States. The legislation considered in each case was
grounded on the expansion of Congress’ powers—with the corresponding diminution of
state sovereignty . . . .
163. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509, 518 (2004).
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is” understanding of the Tenth Amendment.
The critical key to successful abrogation and also not violating the Tenth
Amendment is that the legislation must be valid and therein lies the seeds for
confusion. Generally, Fourteenth Amendment legislation is invalid if it fails to
meet the state action requirement or if it fails the Test. Moreover, there are
aspects of these two reasons that overlap and contribute to the confusion, but
the following analysis demonstrates that they are integral parts of the
development of the law surrounding the Shield, the Void, and the Circling Back
Phenomenon.
A. The State Action Requirement as a Fourteenth Amendment Limitation
In the Civil Rights Cases (CRC), 164 the Court interpreted Sections 1 and 5
to mean that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to enact the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 to prohibit race discrimination in “private inns and hotels, and
certain public conveyances and places of amusement.” 165 Emphasizing the
Tenth Amendment, the Court held that without state action, 166 there can be no
Fourteenth Amendment violation. 167 The Court rejected Justice Harlan’s
opinion that the state’s failure to protect people from private discrimination
was, in essence, state action. 168 Critically, the CRC Court explicitly left open
the question whether the Commerce Clause would be a valid source of power
to sustain the 1875 Civil Rights Act. 169
Eighty-one years later, critical issues raised by the 1883 Civil Rights Cases
reappeared at the in Intersection in two iconic cases—Heart of Atlanta Motel

164. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
165. Id. at 11.
166. The “citizenship clause” of the Amendment does not have a state action requirement; it
overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) and makes the newly freed slaves citizens.
For a persuasive argument that protecting equal citizenship of individuals does not require state action,
see Balkin, supra note 9 at 1833 (“To prevent some Americans from being relegated to a second-class
form of citizenship, Congress may—and indeed must—reach private as well as public activity.”).
167. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
168. Justice Harlan dissented in the Civil Rights Cases, reasoning that state action includes a state’s
failure to prevent private discrimination on the basis of race. Id. at 46-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This
issue surfaced in more recent cases that were not about race, but the Court held that state inaction is not
state action. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2002) (no property interest in
having restraining order enforced and police failure to respond to mother’s plea for help from abusive
father is not state action); DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no
state action when father beat his son Joshua even though state social workers were aware he was being
abused).
169. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19. Interestingly, the CRC Court also noted that individuals
who are harmed by private people typically have state remedies, implying there is no need to impose
another remedial scheme based on federal law. This Article goes further and suggests States should
provide money damages when individuals are harmed by state action.
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v. United States 170 and Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie’s Barbeque). 171 At issue
was the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which—like the 1875
Act—prevented private businesses from discriminating on the basis of race in
public accommodations. 172 The 1964 Act was enacted pursuant to Congress’s
power under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.173
While the CRC Court left the Commerce Clause question open, 174 the Heart of
Atlanta Court upheld the 1964 Act under the Commerce Clause and explicitly
left open whether it was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 175
In 1964, then, the Court intimated that Congress’s Section 5 enforcement
power might authorize legislation like the 1964 Act—even though the 1964 Act
prohibited the same conduct as the 1875 Act which was struck down in the Civil
Rights Cases because there was no state action. This intimation comports with
Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases that state inaction is state
action. 176 Not surprisingly, the contemporary Court has reaffirmed that state
inaction is not state action. 177 However, and as analyzed below in Part III.B.3,
valid enforcement legislation that imposes obligations on states as deterrent
measures to prevent actual constitutional violations, in essence, make states
“act” and their failure to act makes them vulnerable to money damages if the
legislation clearly intends to abrogate their immunity. 178
Although the Heart of Atlanta Court left open the Section 5 issue, the
170. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
171. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
172. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243–44.
173. Id. at 249.
174. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19.
175. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 (“This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which
it [Congress] acted [the Fourteenth Amendment] was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass,
but merely that, since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here, we have considered it
alone.”).
176. In the 1966 case, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), the Court upheld a federal law
that prohibited private discrimination in commerce, but the Justices were divided over the question
whether Congress could prohibit such conduct under its Section 5 power. The Court in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 528 (2000) held it could not. The Court’s intimation in the Civil Rights cases could
also mean it saw merit in Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Heart of Atlanta Court that state action exists
because state judges enforce state (trespass) laws—relying on the controversial Shelley v. Kraemer
decision. For an excellent article that argues Shelley should have been decided under the Thirteenth
Amendment case law, see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (2007). But see Carol M. Rose, Shelley v. Kraemer Through the Lens of
Property, in PROPERTY STORIES (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, eds., 2004) (Shelley was
correctly decided under property law). Some studies show that the decision had a measurable impact on
racial segregation patterns in the 1950s. See, e.g., Yana Kucheva & Richard Sanders, The Misunderstood
Consequences of Shelley v. Kramer, 49 SOC. SCI. RES. 212 (2014) (“limiting the enforceability of
restrictive covenants enabled a new kind of black intra-city migration.”). However, the Section 5 cases
have not implicated Shelley-type issues.
177. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599 (Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, not private
conduct).
178. See infra Part III.B.3.
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holding highlights that Congress has the Commerce Clause power to prohibit
discrimination by private persons engaged in commerce and this enables the
Circling Back Phenomenon. Moreover, rights created by Congress using its
Article I powers are statutory rights. The difference between a statutory right
and a constitutional right might not seem significant to someone who
experiences race discrimination. For example, Ollie’s Barbeque had to serve
African Americans because of the CRA, not because of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the difference did not matter in everyday life. But statutory
rights are vulnerable to changing or disappearing altogether depending on the
political majority. Constitutional rights can also change and disappear, but they
are more insulated by the arduous amendment process, 179 Article III’s life
tenure and salary protections for federal judges 180 and the judiciary’s respect
for stare decisis. 181
Importantly, the availability of remedies for violations are not the same for
statutory and constitutional rights. Circling Back, Seminole Tribe held that
Congress cannot abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under Article I, but it
can hold states to standards using its Article I powers. Congress also has Article
I power to create private rights of action for damages against private people. 182
Contrastingly, § 1983, although valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity because Congress did not make its
intent to do so clear. 183 In addition to a clear intent to abrogate, legislation under
Section 5 also must meet the Boerne Test, another significant limitation on
Congress’s enforcement power.

179. U.S. CONST. art. V. I thank Michael Brennan for this insight.
180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
181. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases
and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be
disappointed.
Id.
182. Alleged violations of federal statutory rights also can be brought under § 1983. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). However, the contemporary Court, consistent with the Shield, is also
establishing higher hurdles for those types of cases. See, e.g, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282
(2002) (“[I]f Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and
unambiguous terms – no less and no more than what is required for Congress to create new rights
enforceable under an implied private right of action.”).
183. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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B. The “Congruence and Proportionality” Test as a
Fourteenth Amendment Limitation
To understand the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under the Test,
it is helpful to briefly review the basic Fourteenth Amendment analytical
framework because it defines the relationship between the state and the
individual. When Congress, through its enforcement power, interjects itself into
that relationship, things change. Moreover, the direction changes take is
determined by the Court in its Marbury role to “emphatically say what the law
is.” 184
1. Background: The Basic Fourteenth Amendment Analytical Framework
In Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products, 185 the Court
introduced the concept of heightened judicial review for laws that burden
fundamental rights and also for laws that discriminate against “discrete and
insular minorities,” like racial minorities. 186 Prior to heightened review, the
Court subjected laws to rational basis review, regardless of what was at stake
for an individual. This flat standard of review nullified the reality that
fundamental rights are more important than other rights, and that some types of
discrimination are more unacceptable than other types. Given this reality,
holding the government to higher standards to justify laws that regulate
fundamental rights or that discriminate against particular groups not only is
logical, but it is an analytical framework that is necessary to give meaning to
the constitutional design with respect to individual liberties. 187
184. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
185. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
186. Id. The Court said:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . Nor need we enquire . . . whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id.
187. I explore the importance of maintaining the basic Fourteenth Amendment analytical framework
in my article, Sharon E. Rush, Whither Sexual Orientation Analysis?: The Proper Methodology When
Due Process and Equal Protection Intersect, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 685 (2008). Renown
scholars criticize the analytical framework, among other reasons, for the Court’s imposition in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) of the disparate impact rule and the need to prove an illegal
motive in order for heightened review to apply to facially neutral laws. See generally Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987). Consistent with addressing this criticism, Professor Vicki C. Jackson persuasively argues for
“proportionality” review in her article, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
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Since Footnote 4, of course, the Court has embellished its equal protection
and due process hierarchies. Fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny,188
except that a woman’s right to choose, although part of an individual’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to “liberty,” is subject to the “undue burden
standard.” 189 On the equal protection side, the most unacceptable forms of
discrimination—like race discrimination—also are subject to strict scrutiny, 190
except discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to intermediate scrutiny.191
If a law under due process or equal protection is not subject to heightened
review, it merely has to be rational. 192
This basic analytical framework defines critical Fourteenth Amendment
relationships. Whenever an individual challenges the constitutionality of a state
law, 193 the individual is challenging his or her fellow-citizens majority vote to
impose whatever the state law’s requirement is. When the analytical framework
requires only that the majority act rationally, it is logical for it to be harder for
the individual to win a challenge. Couched in terms of the distinction in the
Tenth Amendment between the state and the people, in the realm of rational
basis review, the people have delegated to the state the power to act as their
collective “rational” selves. In fact, laws are presumed to be rational and the
individual challenging a law under this level of review has the burden to show
3094 (2015) (“A standard focused not only on the nature of the classification but also on the relative
nature of the harm complained of and its relationship to the particular government interests at stake would
allow courts the flexibility to hold legislatures accountable without invalidating most legislation.”). Id. at
3178.
188. Strict scrutiny review requires the state to justify the underlying law by demonstrating that it is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Univ.
of Michigan has a compelling state interest in admitting a diverse law school class and race can be one
factor in a holistic review of each applicant).
189. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (a woman has a right to an abortion
prior to viability but the state can regulate her choice so long as it does not impose an undue burden on
her or place substantial obstacles in her path).
190. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In evaluating the constitutionality
of the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry during WWII to relocation camps, the Court held:
“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . .
[and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”). Id. at 216.
191. Under intermediate scrutiny, the law will be upheld if it is substantially related to an important
government interest. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1966), the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute’s policy of admitting only male
students was unconstitutional because VMI could not demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for the policy. Id. at 517, 534. This language did not substantively change the standard of
review and the Court in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–29 (2003),
recently cited to both VMI and Craig as the standard of review in sex discrimination cases. Infra Part III
(analyzing Hibbs).
192. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (in upholding a state law that
required a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses, the Court opined: “It is enough that there
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.”).
193. A different analysis applies when an individual alleges that an individual state actor or a local
government has violated his or her rights and that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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it serves no legitimate state end. 194
Flip the analysis and view it from the individual’s perspective. Again,
couched in terms of the distinction between the state and the people, when an
individual is separating from the majority’s effort to have the state law
represent the people, there must be a different analytical framework to support
the importance of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection
guarantees that are subject to heightened review. The “majority wins” aspect of
a democracy yields in the heightened review spaces to the democratic principle
that individual rights need to be protected from majoritarian oppression. In such
cases, the people of the state cannot delegate to their state the power to deny
the individual the framework of analysis—heightened review—that comports
with the important distinction between ordinary and fundamental rights, on the
one hand, and acceptable versus unacceptable discrimination, on the other
hand, as decided by the Court. In fact, the people of the United States delegated
this heightened protection of due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government—both to the Supreme Court,
through its interpretative powers, and to Congress, through its enforcement
power. 195
2. City of Boerne v. Flores 196
At issue in Boerne was the question whether Congress exceeded its Section
5 power when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
requiring states to meet the strict scrutiny standard of review for laws that
burden the free exercise of religion but otherwise are neutral and generally
applicable. 197 Significantly, the Court held in a previous case, Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 198 that such laws merely
194. This is an incredibly high burden to meet because the Court has held that any conceivable
rational purpose will sustain the law. See, e.g., U.S. RR. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (proffered
justification for the law does not need to be the actual reason for it; it only has to be rationally related to
a legitimate government interest). Occasionally, a law will fail rational basis review. See, e.g., Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Amendment 2 to Colorado’s Constitution that repealed local laws that
prohibited sexual orientation discrimination served no legitimate purpose and was motivated by animus);
see also City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (requiring use permit
for home for mentally disabled served no legitimate purpose and was motivated by irrational prejudice).
195. The contemporary Court in Boerne does not view Congress as a co-equal partner under Section
5 because it essentially gives Congress no power to share in the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). More recently, Professor Pamela S.
Karlan describes the Court’s view of Congress as disdainful. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court,
2011 Term-Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2012).
196. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
197. Id. at 515.
198. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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have to meet rational basis review. The Boerne Court held that imposing the
higher standard of review on states exceeded Congress’s power because RFRA
created a new right and therefore was not an enforcement of an existing right.
More emphatically, RFRA essentially overruled Smith, which was its intent as
stated in the law, 199 and obviously Congress does not have the power to
overrule the Court through ordinary legislation. 200 From this perspective,
Boerne is deceptively easy.
Boerne also teaches that the standard of review that attaches to the
constitutional right under the basic analytical framework is part of the right. In
the context of state laws that burden religious free exercise but which are
neutral on their face and generally applicable, this right in Smith was subject to
rational basis review, but this right in RFRA was subject to strict scrutiny. By
raising the standard of review, RFRA created a new right—changed the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment separate from any concerns about
overruling the Court—and that exceeded its enforcement power.
In reaching this conclusion, the Boerne Court held that Congress’s power
is remedial, 201 which is the same standard applied in the Civil Rights Cases,202
but which is narrower than the plenary standard applied in Fitzpatrick.203
199. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515.
200. Id. at 529. Professor Balkin questions why Congress’s interpretation of RFRA, particularly
because RFRA as applied to the federal government is constitutional as decided in Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), is not supported by the Necessary and Proper
Clause and McCulloch. Balkin, supra note 9, at 1814. This is an interesting question when viewed from
the perspective of Congress’s role, if any, in constitutional interpretation. From a federalism perspective,
though, the decision in Gonzales is consistent with the principle that the political majority (U.S. citizens)
can enact laws that give individuals more constitutional protection than is required. That is what federal
RFRA accomplished; it subjected federal RFRA to the compelling interest standard and the federal
government failed to meet its burden to stop the importation of an illegal drug that was used for religious
purposes. As applied to the states, however, the Boerne Court held that Congress (U.S. citizens) cannot
impose a higher constitutional burden on states than is constitutionally required. If the citizens of a state
want to enact a RFRA that gives greater protection to its citizens, that generally would be constitutional,
but, of course, it also would be subject to other constitutional limitations. See generally Berta E.
Hernandez-Truyol, Religion: Rites vs. Rights Resolving Tensions Between LGT Equality and Religious
Liberty, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. Ziegler, ed.)
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with author).
201. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522.
202. Id. at 524. Post & Siegel, supra note 195, at 475–76 (exploring how reliance on the Civil Rights
Cases is misguided because it is “largely irrelevant” to the scope of Congress’s Section 5 power.).
203. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). It is not clear why the Fitzpatrick Court
changed the standard, but two significant voting rights cases, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), were decided just ten years earlier. Those cases
(the VRA cases) evaluated the constitutionality of various provisions, including the preclearance
requirement, of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA), which was enacted pursuant to Congress’s power
under Section 2 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” U.S. Const. amend XV,
§ 2. Although the VRA was enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment, notably, Section 10(a)
authorizes the Attorney General to enforce the Act “[i]n the exercise of the powers of Congress under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and section 2 of the fifteenth amendment.” South Carolina, 383
U.S. at 348. Boerne’s return to the remedial standard, given the Fitzpatrick Court’s reasoning for holding
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Naturally, given the contemporary Court’s protection of state sovereignty, the
return to the remedial standard is not surprising. 204 Nor is it surprising that the
dissenting Justices argue for the plenary standard. 205 But this presupposes that
only one of those standards applies, much like the Court pre-Footnote 4
functioned on the same rational basis review standard regardless of what was
at issue.
I suggest that the Test would comport more accurately with the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, would not violate separation of powers principles,
and would also function with more clarity, if the scope of Congress’s power
varied so that it comports with the Court’s basic analytical framework in which
the standard of review varies depending on the importance of the underlying
right. Toward this goal, it is time to unravel the Test. Recall that Congress’s
enforcement power extends to enacting legislation that is congruent and
proportional “to the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end.” 206
3. Unraveling Congruence and Proportionality
a. The Boerne Inconsistency
The Boerne Court held that Congress’s enforcement power is remedial, but
its description of what “remedial” means is confusing as the following passage
shows: “Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall
with the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into
‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” 207
The idea that Congress can use its enforcement power, not just to “remedy”
violations, but also to “deter” them, seems inconsistent with the basic holding
of Boerne: that Congress does not have power to create rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, a law that provides a remedy helps make
that it is plenary, is quite significant in light of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013),
discussed infra at Part III.B.4.
204. To support its conclusion, the Boerne Court stressed that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment originally used the “necessary and proper” language, but changed it to the “appropriate”
language after extensive debate. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (the original language
partially read, “The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure . . . .”). The Morgan Court also explicitly refers to the language change in the Amendment and
held that “[t]he substitution of the ‘appropriate legislation’ formula was never thought to have the effect
of diminishing the scope of this congressional power.” Id. at 650 n.9 (referring to the Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 83 (Representative Bingham, a principal draftsman of the Amendment and earlier
proposals). Professor Balkin argues that the McCulloch standard is the correct one to apply in evaluating
Section 5 legislation. Balkin, supra note 9, at 1810–15.
205. See infra Part III.
206. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
207. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455).
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an injured person whole. Clearly, Congress’s enforcement power is remedial in
the sense that it extends to remedying actual constitutional violations.208 A law
that provides a deterrent, however, helps prevent an actual constitutional
violation from happening. Deterrent measures impose obligations on states to
act to prevent constitutional violations. Individuals benefit from such measures,
almost as if they enjoy the right to be protected from suffering a potential actual
constitutional violation. This is what I call the Boerne inconsistency and it
spawns tremendous confusion about how the Test is supposed to function. The
late Justice Scalia opined that Congress’s power is no broader than remedying
actual constitutional violations, 209 which obviates the confusion, but the Court
has not adopted that position. Much of the confusion, in my opinion, stems from
the Court’s application of the flat “remedial” standard to define the scope of
Congress’s enforcement power, regardless of whether the constitutional value
that needs to be protected is federalism or individual rights.
b. An Imaginary Federal Target with Three Zones
As a visual guide to the following analysis, represented by the diagram in
the Appendix, imagine a federal target with three rings that represent the federal
statute. The bull’s-eye (Zone 1) represents the space of Fourteenth Amendment
rights and unlawful state action in Zone 1 is an actual constitutional violation.
For clarity, Zone 1 is divided into Zones 1A and 1B, representing the reality
that some rights are subject to rational basis review (Zone 1A) and some are
subject to heightened review (Zone 1B). The next ring (Zone 2) represents the
statutory deterrent measures, or, as I call them, “shadow rights,” 210 given in the
enforcement statute and unlawful state action in this space results in “shadow
violations.” 211 By shadow rights and violations, I mean actual violations of the
208. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
209. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 44 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring judgment)
(referring to his dissenting opinion in Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (“Nothing in Section 5 allows
Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or ‘remedy’
conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (italics in original).
Infra Part III.B.4.b (analyzing Coleman). This also was the position of Justice Harlan in Morgan, 384
U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
210. I use “rights” in the lay sense for clarity’s sake, because in legal context, the Court distinguishes
between “rights” and statutory “interests” or “benefits” in the implied right of action context, which is
beyond the scope of this Article. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (section 1983 provides a
remedy only for the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’
of the United States. Accordingly, only ‘rights,’ not ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ may be enforced under that
section.”). For Congress to create a statutory right, “its text must be ‘phrased in terms of the persons
benefited.’” Id. at 291 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 692, n.13 (1979)). Moreover,
the statute must also create a private remedy. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
211. I refer to the enforcement provisions in Zone 2 as “shadow rights” and “shadow violations”
because Congress cannot create rights using its enforcement power and, equally important, they are not
rights in a technical legal sense, but in everyday life, they function like rights, especially to non-lawyers
and potential victims. For example, suppose that Congress provides by statute that employers, including
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enforcement statute that are closely related to actual constitutional violations
because the deterrent measures are targeted at preventing actual constitutional
violations in Zone 1. The Court’s emphasis on the remedial nature of
Congress’s enforcement power under the Test confirms that Zone 1 does not—
and constitutionally cannot—cast a long shadow. In other words, the Zone 2
band on the target is not wide and, as will become evident, is even shrinking.
Finally, the outer ring (Zone 3) represents other “rights” 212 given by the federal
statute. Zone 3 “rights” and violations are subject to the law governing
Congress’s Article I powers and limitations.
c. How does the Test Work?
Zone 1: Actual Constitutional Violations
The late Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court in United States v.
Georgia in 2006, opined that “no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power
to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the [Fourteenth] Amendment by creating
private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions.”213
Enforcement legislation that remedies actual constitutional violations in Zone
1 is valid as long as the law includes a clear statement that Congress intends to
abrogate a state’s immunity. Moreover, it does not matter whether the violated
right is in Zone 1A or 1B because the standard of review is part of the
underlying right. Admittedly, an actual violation in Zone 1A will be less likely
to happen because that space only requires rational basis review and it is rarer
for an individual to suffer irrational discrimination than it is for an individual
to suffer discrimination that is subject to heightened review in Zone 1B. But
the likelihood of suffering an injury in Zone 1 is irrelevant in evaluating
whether the enforcement statute meets the Test, because the law is premised on
the individual having already suffered the injury. Significantly, it is apt to
define Congress’s enforcement power “remedial” in this space, because that is
exactly what the statute does; it remedies actual constitutional violations.
Thus, application of the Test does not present confusing issues with respect
to Zone 1. However, two puzzling issues lurk in this Zone. First, Congress
state employers, have to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities. Clearly, disability
discrimination is a right that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and a violation of the right would
fall into Zone 1. One might call the “reasonable accommodations” provision a statutory “right,” and, in
everyday conversation, it makes sense to talk about the “right to be reasonably accommodated.” Again,
Congress cannot create rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the “reasonable
accommodations” provision is a deterrent measure or remedy that must meet the Test—that is prevent
and remedy violations of the constitutional right—to be valid enforcement legislation.
212. Again, the underlying federal statute might create rights, but it might create “interests” or
“benefits.” See supra note 210.
213. 546 U.S. at 158 (italics in original).
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could amend § 1983 to provide that it clearly intends to abrogate a state’s
sovereign immunity. This would maximize its enforcement power in all of
Zone 1. It also is the best way to avoid the Void and provide money damages
against states for individuals who are actually harmed when their Fourteenth
Amendment rights are violated. Moreover, the line of cases explored below
under the Test all include a clear expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate
states’ immunity, evidencing Congress’s support for making this avenue of
redress available. 214 Indeed, it is ironic that statutes like the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), for example, include clear
statements but whether they successfully abrogate turns on meeting the Test,
but § 1983—the historic valid Fourteenth Amendment statute—fails to
abrogate because it lacks the clear intent statement. 215 Finally, even if § 1983
were amended to include such a statement, the Circling Back Phenomenon
would still be in play and Congress would have Article I power, the Young
doctrine, and enforcement by the United States to regulate states and hold them
to standards.
The second puzzlement in Zone 1 relates to the question whether a
particular enforcement statute that fails the Test as explored below in Zone 2,
nevertheless remains valid with respect to abrogating a state’s immunity for
actual violations in Zone 1. The reason for the confusion seems to be that the
plaintiffs in the cases that failed abrogation, unlike the plaintiff in Georgia, did
not suffer actual constitutional violations so Zone 1 is never implicated in those
cases. 216 An amendment to § 1983 to include the clear statement rule, naturally,
would obviate this confusion because it would provide a right of action for any
individual who suffers an actual constitutional violation while leaving the Test
intact to be applied to Zone 2 violations.
Zone 2: The Enforcement Statute’s Remedial and Deterrent Measures
This Zone harbors most of the confusion because this is where the heart of
214. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (ADA); Fla. Bd. of Regents
v. Kimel, 528 U.S. 62, 73–74 (2002) (ADEA) (Justices Kennedy and Thomas dissented on this point, at
99–100); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (FMLA).
215. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“The language of § 1983 falls
far short of satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that, if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do
so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 474
U.S. 234 (1985)).
216. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157 (paraplegic inmate in state prison suffered actual violations of his
Eighth Amendment rights (incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment) and also alleged violations
of Title II of the ADA but case was remanded for clarification of his pro se complaint in evaluating his
ADA claims). But see infra Part IV.B (discussing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
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the Test applies, although Zone 1 also plays a significant role because the
validity of the enforcement statute is closely connected to the underlying
constitutional right.
Understanding the Relationships at Stake: Boerne’s progeny show that the
shadow rights created by the enforcement statute in this Zone are more likely
to meet the Test the more closely they are targeted at deterring actual
constitutional violations in Zone 1. Again, Zone 1 does not cast a long shadow.
However, it does cast two shadows and the shadow cast by Zone 1A is, and
should be, shorter than the one cast by Zone 1B. Specifically, in Zone 1A—the
rational basis space—the Tenth Amendment predominantly defines the critical
relationships among the state, the individual, and Congress: states have more
leeway in the rational basis review space in regulating individual rights, 217 and
therefore Congress should have less leeway in that space regulating states. In
fact, the Court has held that states are not violating the Constitution unless they
are acting irrationally—or as I describe it, have “gone wild.” As explored
below, legislation that connects Zones 1A and 2 have all failed abrogation,
which illustrates how unlikely it is that states will have gone wild. 218 Therefore,
there should be less need for Congress to use its enforcement power, and the
Court should be less deferential, consistent with striking the appropriate
federalism balance. Conversely, in Zone 1B—the heightened review space—
the Fourteenth Amendment predominantly defines the relevant relationships:
states have less leeway in the heightened review space in regulating individual
rights, and Congress should have more leeway in that space regulating states.
A brief overview of a few important Section 5 cases illustrates that this
description accurately reflects how the Court applies the Test.
The Zone 1B and Zone 2 Relationships: The Court upheld enforcement
legislation in two cases that involved Zone 1B rights. 219 To highlight, using the
217. This is not to say, of course, that an individual’s rights cannot be violated even in the rational
basis realm, because the Court has held some laws unconstitutional under rational basis review. See, e.g.,
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (requiring permit for group
home for mentally disabled served no legitimate purpose and was motivated by “irrational prejudice.”);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance defining family in way that prohibited a
grandmother from living with grandsons who were cousins and not siblings unconstitutional). For an
excellent analysis of Moore, see Nancy E. Dowd, John Moore Jr.: Moore v. City of East Cleveland and
Children’s Constitutional Arguments, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2603 (2017). Nor is this to say that Congress
lacks the enforcement power for actual constitutional violations. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158. However,
enforcement legislation targeted at actual violations that harm individuals is different from more
generalized enforcement legislation when a state does not have a history and pattern of irrational
discrimination.
218. An exception might be in the area of LGBTQ rights. See ARAIZA, supra note 9.
219. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721 (involving sex discrimination) and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004) (involving disability discrimination in the administration of judicial services). In Georgia, 546
U.S. at 151, the Court reviewed a state prisoner’s pro se lawsuit against the state alleging violations of his
rights under Title II of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in public services. Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 337, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000 ed. and Supp. II). He
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Court’s comparative terminology highlighted in italics, it seems that the general
rule for meeting the Test is this: if the constitutional right is subject to
heightened review, then the Court will be more deferential and it will be easier
for Congress to meet the Test. This is consistent with the Court’s holdings in
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs 220 and Tennessee v. Lane. 221
In Hibbs, the Court upheld Congress’s power in the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) to require employers (including state employers) to give
employees unpaid time off to provide for family and medical care. 222 The
constitutional right at stake was Mr. Hibb’s right to be free from sex
discrimination, which is subject to intermediate scrutiny, placing it in Zone
1B. 223 There is no constitutional right to take unpaid leave for family and
medical care. That shadow right (preventive measure) came from the FMLA,
placing it in Zone 2. The question presented was whether Congress’s use of its
enforcement power to connect Zone 1B with Zone 2 was constitutional under
both the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, making abrogation valid. 224
Congress presented evidence of a history and pattern of sex discrimination
in the workplace by state employers and opined that “[s]tereotypes about
women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack
of domestic responsibilities for men.” 225 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, held that the FMLA family and medical care provisions met the Test
and successfully abrogated states’ sovereign immunity. 226 On the federal target,
the Zone 2 shadow rights were congruent and proportional to preventing and
remedying sex discrimination - Zone 1B violations. 227
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion was joined by Justice O’Connor
and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer. Fair observation: Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor joined with the other four Justices to
uphold abrogation of the family care provision of the FMLA because of the
widespread and historically persistent sex inequality in the United States. The
also alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The Court remanded his case with instructions on how
to clarify his complaint so that it was clearer what his allegations were under different laws so that the
Court could better evaluate whether the Test was satisfied. In its opinion, Justice Scalia opined that
Congress has the power to abrogate for actual constitutional violations. Id. at 157–58. In contrast, the
Court held in Morrison that the VAWA, involving sex discrimination, was invalid because there was no
state action and violence is not an economic activity. See supra Part II.
220. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721.
221. Lane, 541 U.S. at 509.
222. The Court held that the self-care provision of the FMLA did not validly abrogate in Coleman
v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30, 35 (2012). Infra Part III.B.4.b (analyzing Coleman).
223. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
224. Regardless, the FMLA is constitutional under Article I, placing it in Zone 3, and the Circling
Back Phenomenon would apply.
225. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
226. Id. at 725.
227. Id. at 737.
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Chief Justice even referred to the widespread discrimination against women
based on stereotypes about their unsuitability for work outside the home.228
Critically important, their votes in support of valid abrogation acknowledged
that failure to provide the statutory leave would not necessarily result in a
constitutional violation in Zone 1B. In other words, the majority vote rested on
an acknowledgement that Zone 2 legislation can be valid even if the Zone 2
preventive measure can be violated without also having a concomitant Zone 1B
violation. This is an affirmation of the Boerne inconsistency. 229
In this way, finding a history and pattern serves as evidence of the
“likelihood” of an actual constitutional violation occurring and the “likelihood”
that the preventive measure will deter it from happening. Imposing on state
employers a measure such as the family care provision in the FMLA undeniably
is likely to prevent some sex discrimination. This observation is further
supported by the increasing knowledge and understanding about how implicit
bias functions. 230 In other words, while the history of sex discrimination started
because of explicit bias against women, we now know that discrimination can
be the result of unintentional or implicit bias. Nevertheless, questions remains:
how is “likely” to be measured? And, more importantly, who should decide
whether “likely” is met? In answering these questions, the difference between
a Zone 1A and Zone 2 connection versus a Zone 1B and Zone 2 connection is
highly relevant. Given Congress’s explicit role in enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment, once the Court has determined the meaning of the Amendment
(consistent with its role in a Marbury sense), then Congress’s judgment in
evaluating “likelihoods” in Zone 1B and Zone 2 relationships should control
(consistent with McCulloch). This would be a harmonious separation of powers
balance.
Similarly, but with a twist, the Lane Court upheld Congress’s power under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to abrogate states’
sovereign immunity in order to prevent disability discrimination in “cases
implicating the accessibility of judicial services.” 231 Mr. Lane faced criminal
charges that required him to appear for hearings in a courthouse that lacked
elevator access. 232 Significantly, his complaint also included a claim that the
228. Id. at 728–32.
229. See supra Part III.B.3.a.
230. For an excellent analysis of how implicit bias negatively affects working environments, see
Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (2017). See also Jason P. Nance,
Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017) (school
safety context).
231. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). Although disability discrimination is subject to
rational basis review, it is still a Zone 1A violation if the unlawful state action is irrational.
232. Mr. Lane crawled up the stairs to make his first appearance, but he refused to do that in his
second appearance and he also refused to be carried up the stairs to the hearing room. Lane, 541 U.S. at
514. The other plaintiff, Beverly Jones, was a court reporter who also is a paraplegic and alleged she lost
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state violated his Due Process rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment (Zone 1B). 233
Although disability discrimination falls into Zone 1A because it is subject
to rational basis review, 234 the ADA also “seeks to enforce a variety of other
basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more
searching judicial review.” 235 For example, the ADA requires states “to take
reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to
accessibility.” 236 This requirement creates a Zone 2 “shadow right” (preventive
measure). Because the Court was evaluating a Zone 1B and Zone 2 relationship,
it was easier for Congress to meet the Test and the Court was more deferential
to Congress’s judgment. The Court noted, that “the record of constitutional
violations . . . including judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and
statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the enjoyment of public services—far exceeds
the record in Hibbs.” 237 The Lane Court upheld the provision of the ADA. 238
Notably, in Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist departed ways with the Hibb’s
majority (including Justice O’Connor) on the point about how close the
relationship between Zone 1 and Zone 2 needs to be in order for enforcement
legislation to be valid. Specifically, the Chief Justice dissented in Lane because
he was persuaded that Congress provided no evidence of a history and pattern
of actual constitutional violations or even arguable constitutional violations by
the states based on disability. Without that, he opined that there can be no Zone
2 validity. Stated alternatively, the preventive measures in Zone 2 cannot be
considered “without regard for whether the failure to accommodate [under the
ADA] results in a constitutional wrong.” 239 In his opinion, moreover, Mr. Lane
work because she could not “gain access to a number of county courthouses.” Id.
233. Id. at 523.
234. City of Cleburne, Tex. V. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443, 446 (1985) (“Our
refusal to recognize the [mentally disabled] as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely
unprotected from invidious discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that
distinguishes between the mentally [disabled] and others must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.”).
235. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23.
236. Id. at 531 (citing to the Act 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2)). But states are not “required to undertake
measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten historic preservation
interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service. §§35.150(a)(2), (a)(3).” Id. at 532.
These limitations relate to the scope of Congress’s enforcement power, but they also are relevant to the
Act’s validity under Article I if and when the Circling Back Phenomenon takes place. Specifically, the
anti-commandeering principle presumably would invalidate a congressional mandate that made states
engage in certain activities or incur certain expenses. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor also note this
distinction in their concurring opinion in Garrett. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
376 (2001).
237. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529.
238. Id. at 533–34.
239. Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (italics in original). Given that he treated Lane as a Zone
1A (not Zone 1B) and Zone 2 relationship, his opinion fits into the basic analysis for those relationships.
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did not even suffer an actual constitutional violation. 240
Critically, and as the dissenting Justices highlight, there is a strong parallel
between the histories of sex and disability discrimination. Just as women and
men throughout history have been held back because of sex stereotyping, so
too have people with disabilities. Just as the Court itself sanctioned sex
discrimination, 241 so has it done the same with respect to disability
discrimination. 242 Arguably, the misstep in the comparison of these two types
of discrimination comes from the Court’s decision to apply rational basis
review and not heightened review to disability discrimination under the basic
analytical framework, 243 which is directly related to Congress’s power under
Section 5. One can only speculate whether the Chief Justice would have voted
to sustain the validity of the ADA in Lane, just as he did in Hibbs, if disability
discrimination were subject to heightened review. Regardless, it is difficult to
reconcile the outcomes in the cases in light of the widespread stereotyping and
histories of discrimination faced by people in both equal protection classes.
Again, this evidences how delicate the voting balance is in the Section 5 cases.
Zone 1A and Zone 2 Relationships: In contrast to the Hibbs and Lane
decisions, cases that involve Zone 1A and Zone 2 relationships fail to meet the
Test. One might say relationships here are theoretical place holders. This is not
surprising because Congress would have to produce evidence that there is a
history and pattern of irrational discrimination by the states—that they have
gone wild—in order for Congress to successfully abrogate in the rational
review basis space. 244 Congress has not been able to show that and therefore
violations of Zone 2 preventive measures in underlying enforcement statutes
have not successfully abrogated states’ sovereign immunity. 245
For example, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 246 the Court faced the question whether Title 1 of the ADA is a valid
exercise of Congress’s abrogation power. Title I protects employees from
disability discrimination in the workplace and requires employers to make
240. Id. at 543.
241. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873) (women do not enjoy the “privilege” of
practicing law).
242. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state compulsory sterilization law for mentally
disabled).
243. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
244. A strong case can be made that discrimination against members of the LGBTQ community is
irrational and widespread and therefore should fall within Congress’s enforcement power—even as a
Zone 1A case. This would be clearer if such discrimination is subject to heightened review and falls into
Zone 1B, but the Supreme Court cases on sexual orientation have failed rational basis review, obviating
the need to decide with certainty where sexual orientation falls on the equal protection paradigm. See
generally Rush, supra note 187; AZAIRA, supra note 9.
245. What this means for the individual who suffers an actual constitutional violation is unclear. See
supra Part III.B.3.c.
246. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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reasonable accommodations for disabled workers. 247 Ms. Garrett, an employee
of the University of Alabama, had to take time off from work to seek medical
care and recover from breast cancer. 248 When she returned to work, however,
her job was no longer available and she had to take a lower paying one. 249 She
sued Alabama for money damages under the ADA (Zone 2). 250 To meet the
Test, Congress would have needed evidence that states have gone wild with
respect to workplace disability discrimination and, understandably, Congress
could not do that. Moreover, Ms. Garrett did not even suffer an actual violation
in Zone 1A, meaning Alabama’s employment decisions were rational and
therefore not unconstitutional. 251 Therefore, Congress lacked enforcement
power to abrogate Alabama’s sovereign immunity under Title I of the ADA.252
Similarly, the Court held that Congress could not show a pattern of
irrational age discrimination with respect to Congress’s enforcement power
under the ADEA in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regent. 253 Like Ms. Garrett, the
Kimel plaintiff also did not suffer an actual constitutional violation. Zone 1A
cases—the “rational basis” cases—protect state sovereignty because that space
is where the people’s collective rationality is presumptively constitutional and
Congress did not produce evidence that the states had gone wild. Again,
requiring states to meet Zone 2 requirements or face potential money damages
is to impose a burden on states that is not constitutionally required and this
violates federalism because the burden effects a substantive change in what is
required of states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 254 However, and to
emphasize, irrational discrimination against an individual by a state actor is a
Zone 1A violation and enforcement legislation that abrogates a state’s
immunity would be valid. 255 These are very different outcomes and reflect a
balancing of the critical Fourteenth Amendment relationships with Tenth
Amendment principles.
247. Id. at 361.
248. Id. at 362. Milton Ash also was a plaintiff who suffered from asthma and alleged his employer
would not accommodate his needs. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 367.
252. Id. at 360. Under the basic Fourteenth Amendment analytical framework, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof to show the employer’s decision was not rational, but the ADA unconstitutionally shifted
the burden to the state. Id. at 372.
253. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
254. Naturally, states can provide individuals with more protection than is constitutionally required
and that also is consistent with federalism and the principle that states are “labs of experimentation.”
However, the analysis is far more complicated when individual rights compete as they do, for example,
in the area of sexual orientation discrimination and religious freedom. See Hernandez-Truyol, supra note
200. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(state civil rights commission violated cakeshop owner’s right to be free from decisions that are hostile to
his religious beliefs when he refused to design a cake for a same-sex couple).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 216–17.
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In reality, the scope of Congress’s power varies: The Boerne Court held
that Congress’s power is remedial, meaning the scope of Congress’s power is
the same regardless of whether Zone 1A or 1B is the target of the legislation.
But it is not the same; Congress’s power is broader when Zones 1B and 2 are
connected. It is broader because the Boerne Court held that it includes the
power to enact preventive or deterrent measures to decrease the likelihood that
a Zone 1 violation will occur. Saying Congress’s power is broader
(substantively different) in Zone 1B, is qualitatively different from saying it is
easier to meet the Test or saying that the Court will give greater deference to
Congress in Zone 1B and Zone 2 relationships. To describe Congress’s power
as “plenary” in the Zone 1B and 2 relationships, not only is more accurate, but
it also provides a more concrete guideline than “easier than” or “harder than,”
because the standard “plenary” is well-established.
Admittedly, if Zone 2 successfully abrogates, then Zone 2 violations are
remedial. More accurately, then, Zone 2 can be both remedial and preventive,
but “remedial” in Zone 2 pertains to statutory “shadow rights and violations,”
and not constitutional rights and violations. Moreover, the Court acknowledges
that it will give greater deference to Congress legislating the Zone 1B and 2
relationships, consistent with an understanding that Congress’s power is
broader.
To acknowledge that Congress’s “remedial” power is broader or narrower
depending on the underlying relationships in the enforcement statute can be
consistent with the contemporary Court’s jurisprudence at the Intersection. In
other words, such an acknowledgement does mean a return to the Tenth
Amendment in the dismissive sense for at least three reasons. First, the Tenth
Amendment is not violated when Congress abrogates for actual violations in
Zone 1. Second, it is the predominant constitutional provision defining the Zone
1A and Zone 2 relationships. Finally, and perhaps the best evidence, is the
Court’s record on protecting state sovereignty. Recall that the contemporary
Court acknowledges Congress’s plenary power under the Commerce Clause
and Necessary and Proper Clause and, simultaneously, infused the Tenth
Amendment with articulable and limiting principles that protect state
sovereignty as analyzed in Parts I and II. “Plenary” is not a limitless standard.
Zone 3: Article I Legislation and the Circling Back Phenomenon
What about Zone 3 and Article I legislation? Sometimes the underlying
federal statute in which Congress tries to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity
is enacted under both Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is why I
describe the imaginary target with three zones because Zone 3 represents
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legislation enacted under Article I. 256 This is true, for example, of the FMLA,
the ADEA, and the ADA. With such legislation, the Test is still relevant only
to Zones 1 and 2, which pertain to the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Zone
3 is not a source of abrogation. Nevertheless, Zone 3 is an extremely important
space, particularly if abrogation fails under the Fourteenth Amendment,
because that invites the Circling Back Phenomenon. Naturally, though, Zone 3
legislation also has to be a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I powers, and,
as explored in detail in Parts I and II, the contemporary Court is protective of
state sovereignty in Zone 3 as well. For example, recall that one reason the
VAWA failed in Morrison is because violence is not an economic activity. 257
4. Zone 2 is Shrinking: Three Cautionary Tales
This Part explores three brewing open questions that bear on the above
analysis, and, with time and a few more cases, it probably will be clearer what
they mean. For now, though, they serve as bellwethers of what might lie ahead
in the development of the law at the Intersection.
a. Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder: 258 The Equal Sovereignty Principle
The Court’s decision in Shelby County significantly reins in Congress’s
enforcement power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which
portends that perhaps a concomitant trend is brewing under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Recall that the Shelby County Court struck down the
preclearance formula in the 1965 VRA, which, at the time, applied to nine states
that Congress found had a history and pattern of violating the voting rights of
African Americans. 259 In the 1960s, because of the unique circumstances and
widespread racial inequality in voting, the Court held that there was no doubt
that Congress was justified in using its enforcement power to protect the voting
rights of African Americans. 260 The Court held that Congress’s use of the old
256. With respect to Congress’s Article I powers, in fact, the federal target only consists of Zone 3
and, if Congress creates an individually enforceable right in that space, it is only a statutory right. Statutory
rights are enforceable under § 1983 but that is beyond the scope of this Article. There is no abrogation in
any event under Seminole Tribe.
257. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 598 (2000).
258. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
259. Those nine states included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia
and parts of North Carolina and Arizona. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 310. For a persuasive argument that
the Shelby County Court changed the prior understanding of the equal sovereignty principle that dealt
with admission of new states to the Union to now limit Congress’s power to target legislation only at
states that engage in bad behavior, see Litman supra note 16. For a perspective on why allowing targeted
legislation promotes federalism and does not violate the equal sovereignty principle if adequately
justified, see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087 (2016).
260. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (“[E]xceptional conditions can justify
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”); see supra Part III.
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formula violated the “equal sovereignty principle.” 261 This principle protects
the equal dignity of states and requires Congress to justify its disparate
treatment of states. 262 The VRA cases also refer to this principle, but note that
it applies in the context of admitting states to the Union on an equal basis. The
Shelby County Court uses it in a different context 263 and held that the use of the
“old” formula did not adequately take into account all of the positive changes
that have occurred since the 1960s.
In contrast, Section 5 legislation, consistent with meeting the Test, is not
meant to sweep up all states in its enforcement arms; it is supposed to target
only those states that have a history and pattern of constitutional violations. In
fact, because of RFRA’s “sweeping coverage” in Boerne, 264 the Court created
the Test, but the scope of its coverage continues to be an issue. For example,
the Morrison Court was concerned that the VAWA applied to all states. 265
Simultaneously, the Hibbs Court held that the FLMA’s requirement that all
states provide a minimum of 12 weeks of unpaid leave for family care met the
Test, but the dissent strongly objected to applying this requirement to all states
and not just offending ones. 266 Interestingly, though, the Section 5 cases were
decided before Shelby County and none of them rests on Congress violating or
not violating the equal sovereignty principle. Indeed, the principle is never
mentioned in the cases—not even in those cases that raise questions about
whether the underlying legislation should apply to all or only offending states.
Simultaneously, the Section 5 cases either cite to the VRA cases or make an
explicit analogy to those cases and the constitutionality of the 1965 VRA as the
Court evaluates the constitutionality of the underlying enforcement legislation
before it. 267 The VRA Court held that Congress’s enforcement power is
measured by McCulloch (plenary) 268 and that the “appropriateness” of
261. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 551.
262. Id. at 544. “’[T]he constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation
of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.” (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580
(1911)). The Shelby County Court noted that the Coyle Court “explained that our Nation ‘was and is a
union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.’” (quoting Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567).
263. Litman, supra note 16.
264. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (RFRA applied to all states and local
governments).
265. United States v. Morrison, 592 U.S. 528 (2000).
266. Hibbs v. Nevada, 538 U.S. 721, 742–43 (2003) (“The constitutional violation that is a
prerequisite to ‘prophylactic’ congressional action to ‘enforce’ the Fourteenth Amendment is a violation
by the State against which the enforcement action is taken.”) (italics in original) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
(Nevada had a leave policy and “The scheme enacted by the Act does not respect the States’ autonomous
power to design their own social benefits regime.”) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia &
Thomas).
267. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737–
38; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2002).
268. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
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Congress’s enforcement power under both Section 2 and Section 5 is measured
by the same standard. 269 Quite significantly, the Court also held that “[t]he basic
test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the
same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to
the reserved powers of the States.” 270 The Court then quoted the famous
McCulloch “let the end be legitimate” standard, and held that Congress’s
enforcement power is as broad as its power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 271
In this way, Shelby County indicates that it almost does not matter whether
Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 is remedial or plenary because
sovereignty principles, including the equal sovereignty principle, will
immunize states from enforcement legislation under both Section 2 and Section
5 except, perhaps, in the most unique circumstances. How unique? The
suggestion is the circumstances needed to justify enforcement legislation would
have to be as exceptionally dire as those that existed when the VRA was enacted
in 1965. 272
Again, this observation brings to mind the suggestion that perhaps the Court
is functioning as if current relationships between the states and individuals are
more like they were at the time of Barron, meaning states can be trusted
again. 273 Certainly, as Congress’s enforcement powers continue to be reined in,
it only makes for a stronger case that state remedies should play a bigger role
at the Intersection.
269. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 325–26 (“’It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged.
Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is
contemplated to make the [Civil War] amendments fully effective.’” (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 345 (1880)). The South Carolina Court went on to note that the same standard even applies to
Congress’s enforcement power under the Eighteenth Amendment (prohibition). Id. at 327. The Shelby
County Court also noted that the enforcement provisions were guided by the same standards. Shelby
County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 n.1 (2013).
270. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 326.
271. “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966).
272. The late Justice Scalia opined in his dissenting opinion in Lane, in fact, that the Test should be
applicable only in race discrimination cases, and added that the “necessary and proper” standard would
be the correct measurement in such cases. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In many ways, Justice Scalia’s suggestion would bring clarity to the Test because Zone 2
would only exist for race discrimination. However, caution would be called for to avoid the collapsible
error. See Rush, supra note 187.
273. Many people, especially people of color, would argue that states still cannot be trusted with
certain equality issues, particularly racial equality issues. Ironically, although society has made significant
progress in race relations, there is still much to be done. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). The “return to a Barron-like
time” observation, sadly, has more than just a ring of truth to it: it also has a deeply unjust element of
truth to it that is all too easily masked behind the positive guidelines many people think the contemporary
Court has contributed to federalism in light of its jurisprudence at the Intersection.
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b. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland: 274 Does Zone 1B Matter?
In 2012 in Coleman, the Court held that the self-care provision under
FMLA did not meet the Test (unlike the family and medical care provision in
Hibbs 275). Mr. Coleman, an employee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
argued that he was discriminated against because of his sex when he was not
given sick leave, but the Court found “scant evidence in the legislative history
of a purported stereotype harbored by employers that women take self-care
leave more than men.” 276 It is not clear whether the self-care provision of the
FMLA in Coleman failed abrogation because it was not congruent and
proportional to remedying sex discrimination (Zone 1B) or because it was not
congruent and proportional to remedying disability discrimination (due to
illness) (Zone 1A). The Court was persuaded that Congress enacted the selfcare provision based on “a concern for the economic burdens on the employee
and the employee’s family resulting from illness-related job loss and a concern
for discrimination on the basis of illness, not sex,” 277 suggesting it was in Zone
1A. Throughout the opinion, though, the Court does not say what level of the
review the purported constitutional right is entitled to, although the opinion
does center on refuting the claim that Mr. Coleman was discriminated against
based on sex.
If Coleman is interpreted as a disability discrimination case in Zone 1A,
Congress could not produce evidence that states are irrationally discriminating
against people with disabilities in providing sick leave and that is why
abrogation failed. If, on the other hand, it was decided as a sex discrimination
case in Zone 1B, which is the stronger argument, in my opinion, then Coleman
is a more significant decision because abrogation failed to meet the Test in a
case involving a heightened review standard. The dissenting Justices in
Coleman—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan—were strongly
persuaded of the evidence that showed the self-care provision was likely to
[check wording] prevent sex discrimination. In fact, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
picks up on this very point and opined that “Congress honed in on gender
discrimination, which triggers heightened review,” and cites to Hibbs, “’[I]t
was [therefore] easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations.’” 278 Justice Ginsburg, joined by the other dissenting Justices, thinks
the Court should have given greater deference to Congress. 279
274. 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
275. See supra Part III.B.3.c.
276. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 38.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 64 (citing Hibbs v. Nevada, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)).
279. In Boerne, the Court opined that the legislative record is not determinative in evaluating the
constitutionality of enforcement legislation. “Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state
of the legislative record Congress compiles but ‘on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally
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It is significant, though, that Hibbs was decided by a 6–3 vote, with Justices
Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas in the dissent. By the time Coleman was decided
nine years later, Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Souter and Stevens were no
longer on the Court and they, along with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were the
majority in Hibbs. In contrast, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 5–4 opinion
in Coleman, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito. The changes in the Court’s composition between Hibbs and Coleman
might explain the different outcomes given the Justices’ overall jurisprudence
in this area. It also indicates that the Roberts Court might be taking a tougher
stance on whether abrogation is valid and this would be consistent with the
fortifying the Shield and protecting state sovereignty. Remember that many of
the federalism cases are 5–4 decisions. 280
c. Zone 3 and The Circling Back Phenomenon: The Scope of
Congress’s Power
From a broader perspective, recall that one of the open issues about the
scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power—even though the definition is
the same today as it was at the time of McCulloch—is whether Congress needs
to produce actual evidence that an economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce or whether Congress’s judgment merely has to be
rational. 281 This mirrors the similar issue dividing the Justices about Congress’s
Section 5 power and the degree of deference the Court will give to Congress in
enacting enforcement legislation. Should the deferential standard be the same?
Although it is logical for it to be harder for Congress to meet the Test in the
rational basis review space, applying the same “actual” evidence standard that
is being applied in the Commerce Clause context seems too harsh, although it
does fortify the Shield.
Moreover, if Coleman is interpreted to mean that the Court is reining in
Congress even in Zone 1B, then applying the “actual” evidence standard in that
space indeed proves too much. It essentially takes the “remedial” standard to
mean only “remedial” and not also “preventive.” This interpretation effectively
eliminates Zone 2 on the imaginary federal target. Notably, mathematical
models facilitate measuring the quantitative impacts of economic regulations
appointed to decided.’” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (quoting Justice Harlan in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970)).
280. Justice Kennedy’s retirement is unlikely to affect the voting balance because he was not a
consequential “swing vote” in most federalism cases.
281. See supra Part II. Justice Breyer raises this in Garrett in which he said, “In my view, Congress
reasonably could have concluded that the remedy before us constitutes an ‘appropriate’ way to enforce
this basic equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution requires.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377 (2001) (Breyers, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter &
Ginsburg).
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under the Commerce Clause, but quantitative measurements of the harmful
effects of stereotyping and other ways in which discrimination can impact an
individual’s life are only beginning to be developed in the social sciences. But
because it is harder to measure discrimination does not mean that it is not real
or that individuals do not suffer real consequences as victims.
For example, social science data is bringing to bear the importance of
acknowledging the phenomenon such as “unconscious bias.” 282 Indeed, many
businesses engaged in commerce are beginning to require their employees to
undertake “implicit bias” training as part of their “best business practices.”283
It would be ironic—an almost unbelievable—if Article I legislation that is
designed to prevent discrimination in private commercial relationships
(remember Ollie’s Barbeque) is given just as much, if not more, deference than
Section 5 legislation that is designed to prevent the state from violating
individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment liberties. This understanding is part of the
federalism balance under the Commerce Clause, but it ignores the history and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—to protect individuals. The Boerne
Court, in adopting the Test, held that, “Judicial deference, in most cases, is
based not on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but ‘on due
regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.’” 284
This augurs in favor of giving at least as much deference to Congress under
Section 5, particularly in Zone 1B and Zone 2 cases, as the Court does under
the Commerce Clause, especially with respect to the explicit and unique role
Congress has to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individuals.
To briefly summarize, the Shield and the Void are persuasive evidence that
one of the Court’s most important concerns is protecting state sovereignty. This
is not to say that the contemporary Court is not concerned about individual
rights. In support of individual rights, it held that the Second Amendment right
to bear arms is an individual right 285 and incorporated the Amendment to apply
to the states. 286 It also held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to
marry. 287 Nevertheless, it is a fair observation that the Court thinks that times
282. See Bornstein, supra note 230; Nance, supra note 230.
283. A recent example is presented by Starbuck’s response to the racial incident when a white
employee called the police and had two black men arrested because they were waiting in the store for a
friend and were not ordering anything. Starbuck’s closed all of its businesses on May 29, 2018 and
required its 175,000 employees to engage in “racial bias training.” See “Here’s What to Expect from
Today’s Starbucks Racial Bias Training,” WASH. POST (Business Section), May 29, 2018, at
https://www.washington post.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/23/ (last visited July 27, 2018).
284. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (quoting Justice Harlan in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207
(1970)). Justice Scalia’s view was to give deference using the Necessary and Proper Clause standard for
legislation that applies to only offending states and state actors. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564
(2004).
285. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
286. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
287. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259988
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259988

2018]

OH, WHAT A TRUISM THE TENTH AMENDMENT IS

54

have changed and that Congress’s enforcement power does not need to be as
broad as it was either at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted or at
the time of the Second Reconstruction. Moreover, reasonable people agree that
the law needs to evolve, presupposing that it will inevitably change over
time. 288 Recall that “changing times” was the rationale for the Shelby County
Court’s decision to strike down Congress’s continued use of the “old” coverage
formula in the VRA. 289
Nevertheless, individuals who are harmed by unlawful state action deserve
remedies. Strengthening the Shield to protect states and leaving individuals
vulnerable to falling into the Void is inconsistent with both the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect individuals and the importance of states. It
would be enormously significant and consistent with the modern Court’s
message about the importance of states if the Court could also provide guidance
on the role of states in protecting the rights of individuals.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE REMEDIES IN THE FEDERALISM BALANCE
A. Section 1983 and Monroe v. Pape: 290 Modifying the Message
Realistically, given the contemporary Court’s jurisprudence at the
Intersection, perhaps it is time to focus on the importance of state remedies
under the Fourteenth Amendment and there is evidence that the Court is
beginning to do that. Admittedly, such a message would necessitate a retreat
from the Court’s long-standing message—since 1961—in Monroe that the
availability of state remedies is irrelevant in § 1983 cases. In Monroe, thirteen
Chicago police officers 291 unlawfully entered the Monroes’ home without a
288. For an excellent analysis of why there can be no definitive “equilibrium” point in the federalism
balance, see Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1749 (2005).
The Constitution’s extended existence over time, moreover, requires adjustment and
adaptation to new circumstances. Indeed, the most likely explanation for constitutional
ambiguity on federalism, to my mind, is that it represents a deliberate strategy on the part
of the Framers to allow the mechanics of federalism to be worked out and adapted
through practice over time . . . .
Id. (footnote omitted).
289. Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 580 (2013).
290. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
291. The city of Chicago, not the state of Illinois, was named as a defendant, along with the police
officers. The Monroe Court held that cities and local governments were not “persons” under § 1983, but
the Court reversed this decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but also
held in Monell that to sue a local government for money damages, the plaintiff must show the local state
actors acted pursuant to an invalid policy. Id. at 690.
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warrant in violation of their federal and state rights, and, “routed them from
bed, made them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room,
emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers.” 292 They also unlawfully
detained Mr. Monroe and interrogated him for 10 hours and never charged him
with a crime. 293 The Monroes sued under § 1983 for damages even though they
could have sued in Illinois state court for violation of their state rights and
received adequate remedies. 294 In holding that state remedies are irrelevant, the
Court said that “[i]t is no answer that the state has a law which if enforced
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked.” 295
The Monroe Court’s message is not surprising given that it was decided
during the 1960s Civil Rights movement. By the time Monroe was decided,
Barron’s holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states was long
gone, 296 and today most of the rights have been incorporated. 297 Interestingly
but not surprisingly, the most active period of incorporation was in the 1960s—
the second Reconstruction period—when the Court incorporated ten rights in
the Bill of Rights. 298 Both the incorporation doctrine and the Monroe Court’s
holding that state remedies are irrelevant under § 1983 are evidence that the
states, particularly at that time, were violating the very fundamental rights
embedded in the Bill of Rights that the Barron Court protected from federal
interference. Thus, state remedies were irrelevant at that time, not necessarily
292. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 195. The idea that a state can provide “adequate” remedies suggests that a wrong
committed under state law is just as heinous as a wrong committed under federal law, including the
Constitution. This is debatable, of course. Nevertheless, being able to get damages under state law might
adequately redress the tangible injuries—medical cost, lost wages, and so forth. Certainly, being able to
recover damages under state law is far better than not being able to recover them at all because of the
Shield and the Void.
295. Id. at 183.
296. For example, the Court incorporated the right to compensation for property taken by the
government in 1897 in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
and the right to free speech in 1925 in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
297. The most notable exception is the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial. See generally
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jury Trial and Remedy Clauses, 96 OR. L. REV. 677 (2017).
298. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (Sixth Amendment right to trial by impartial
jury); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment confrontation clause); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 382 U.S. 213 (1976) (Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment
right to be free from double jeopardy).
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because the existence of state remedies was unimportant, but because the
federal government could not trust states to not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. And because they could not do that, Congress needed to exercise
broad enforcement power under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 299
Modifying the Monroe message would be consistent with the contemporary
Court’s jurisprudence at the Intersection. To highlight, since the 1960s Civil
Rights movement, the contemporary Court has revived the Tenth Amendment,
infused the Eleventh Amendment with Tenth Amendment principles,
significantly curtailed Congress’s Section 5 (and Section 2) enforcement
power, and narrowed its interpretation of §1983. 300 All of these developments
reflect the dawning of a new day for the contemporary Court. In fact, the
contemporary Court rationalizes reining in Congress’s power because of
changing times. This is the rationale for its decision in Shelby County, releasing
it from the preclearance provision of the VRA. With the dawning of this new
day, perhaps it is time to expect more from states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B. The Contemporary Court’s Observations About State Remedies
As the Court began to iron out its jurisprudence about Congress’s Section
5 power by taking a number of cases in somewhat rapid succession after Boerne
in 1997, it also started to include observations about the existence of state
remedies. The force or weight of the Court’s observations fall along a
continuum. At one end (#1), are those Section 5 cases in which the Court says
nothing about state remedies and at the other end (#5) are those cases where
abrogation is successful so that state remedies are less important because
individuals avoid the Void. In between the continuum’s end points are
observations about the importance of state remedies that vary in weight: (#2)
states could or do provide remedies, (#3) states could waive their immunity
under federal law, and (#4) if states provide a remedy, then there is no
constitutional violation. Notably, the same case can exemplify more than one
observation. The important point to take away from this analysis is this:
Regardless of where a particular case falls on the continuum, the Court’s
observations do not send a message that providing state remedies is an
important contribution to protecting individuals under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Example of #1 (nothing about state remedies): Interestingly, the Boerne
299. The late Justice Scalia emphasized this same point in his dissent in Lane. See supra note 272.
300. For example, the Court has read into § 1983 very stringent immunity defenses to protect state
actors, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet
Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2016).
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Court, which established the Test, said nothing about the existence of state
remedies. Justice O’Connor’s dissent, however, focused on the depth of the
states’ commitment to protecting the free exercise of religion and noted that the
“remedy” for laws that unduly burden this right was to accommodate the
individual by excusing them from the legal obligation. 301 Because of that, she
argued that the Court should reconsider its decision in Smith, in which the Court
held that neutral laws of general applicability are constitutional if they meet the
rational basis test. 302 For a state to provide a remedy when an individual right
is violated, however, would demonstrate an even deeper commitment to
protecting that right. But, again, state remedies played no part in the very case
that significantly reined in Congress’s enforcement power.
Example of #2 (could provide or do provide remedies): The Court’s
observations in this group merely reflect the reality that states could provide
remedies and that some states in fact do provide them. For example, in striking
down the VAWA in Morrison in 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist ended his
majority opinion with this observation:
Petitioner Brzonkala’s complaint alleges that she was the victim of a
brutal assault. But Congress’ effort…to provide a federal civil remedy
can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. If the allegations here are true, no civilized
system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy . . . But under our
federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and not by the United States. 303
This message about the importance of state remedies is significant, because
only the state could mitigate the Void in light of the Shield.
Shortly after Morrison, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 304 the Court
held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not
abrogate states’ immunity, and in Garrett, the Court held that neither did the
ADA. Unlike Morrison, the Kimel Court observed that states provide remedies
for age discrimination. Specifically, Justice O’Connor opined that “[s]tate
employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes and may recover
money damages from their state employers, in almost every State of the
Union.” 305 The Garrett Court noted that all states protected individuals from
301. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 552–53 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“By 1789,
every state but Connecticut had incorporated some version of a free exercise clause into its constitution.”).
302. Id. at 544–45.
303. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 627 (2000).
304. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
305. Id. at 91–92. Justice Stevens noted in his opinion that before Congress extended the ADEA in
1974 to apply to public employers, “all 50 States had some form of age discrimination law, but 24 of them
did not extend their own laws to public employers.” Id. at 94 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
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disability discrimination by the time the ADA was enacted in 1990, but also
noted that “[a] number of these provisions…did not go as far as the ADA did
in requiring accommodation.” 306 However, like the Kimel Court, the Garrett
Court did not address states’ remedial measures, and, in particular, whether
money damages were available for violations due to disability discrimination.
When the federal Void appears as it did in Boerne, Morrison, Garrett, and
Kimel, it is significant for the Court to acknowledge that states can or even do
provide remedies. But notice that there is no “punch” behind the Morrison
Court’s’ observations. If Virginia provides a remedy, great; it shows Virginia
is “civilized” in the Court’s eyes. But it does not have to provide a remedy and
presumably the federal government could not make Virginia provide a remedy
because the anti-commandeering principle protects Virginia’s sovereignty and
sovereign immunity. And saying nothing about the availability or unavailability
of state remedies is not a message about the importance of states.
In contrast, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Kimel is more forceful and
suggests that it is important for individuals to have the ability to seek money
damages against their states for age discrimination. Otherwise, why include that
message? Still, her opinion does not connect the absence of federal remedies
with the presence of state remedies in any analytical sense. For example, she
does not say that federal remedies are unnecessary because states provide them.
Nor does she suggest, for example, that Congress’s enforcement power might
be greater or be due greater judicial deference when states do not provide
remedies. Rather, her observation about state remedies is just that; it describes
the reality. Nevertheless, it is a more significant observation about the
importance of state remedies than that in Boerne, Morrison or Garrett.
Example of #3 (could waive their immunity): Justice Kennedy’s observation,
writing for the majority in Coleman in 2012, exemplifies this message. Recall
that the Coleman Court struck down the self-care provision of the FMLA
because it failed congruence and proportionality. This meant that the plaintiffs
fell into the Void and could not sue Maryland for money damages. Their hope
to secure that remedy had to come from Maryland. But Justice Kennedy did not
simply acknowledge that, as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in Morrison, or as
Justice O’Connor did in Kimel. Rather, Justice Kennedy “elbowed” Maryland
in its immunity side to suggest that the money Void is also its responsibility to
address:
Of course, a State need not assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suits for damages . . . Discrimination against women is contrary to
the public policy of the State of Maryland . . . and the State has conceded
that the Act is good social policy . . . If the State agrees with petitioner
that damages liability for violations of the self-care provision is
necessary to combat discrimination against women, the State may waive
306. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5 (2001).
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its immunity or create a parallel state law cause of action.
This message is definitely more forceful than any of the ones mentioned.
But, again, in none of these cases, with the possible exception of Coleman
explored more fully in #4 below, does the Court engage in any critical analysis
about the role states could play in remedying Fourteenth Amendment violations
and how that possibility would affect Congress’s enforcement power. For
example, if states willingly waive their sovereign immunity, there would be
less cause for concern about the federal remedy Void. And if states do not
provide a remedy, then there also should be less concern about protecting state
sovereignty and concomitantly, less concern about giving greater deference to
Congress when it enacts enforcement legislation. To be sure, the Court’s
observations that an individual’s only recourse to secure a remedy for wrongful
state action might be under the individual’s state laws is somewhat of a
recognition that the individual should have a remedy. And if it is not
forthcoming because of the Shield and Void, then why not expect it to come
from the states? At least engaging the complexities of the consequences of the
Shield and the Void to the individual, while simultaneously promoting the
importance of states, would add legitimacy to the recent developments at the
Intersection.
Example of #4 (if they do provide, then no constitutional violation): This
observation is important because it explicitly links state remedies and
constitutional violations. Specifically, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Expense Education Board v. College Savings Bank, 307 College Savings Bank
sued the state of Florida under the Patent Remedy Act (PRA) 308 for patent
infringement. The PRA was enacted under both Article I and Section 5 and it
included a clear statement of intent to abrogate states’ immunity. 309 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that the PRA failed the Test
because “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States,
let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.” 310 Not only was there virtually
no evidence of patent infringement by the states, there was even evidence that
“ʻstates are willing and able to respect patent rights . . .’” 311 Importantly, the
Court held that if states provide a remedy, as Florida did, 312 then there is no
constitutional violation at all. 313 Without a constitutional violation, of course,
307. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
308. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
309. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.
310. Id. at 640.
311. Id. at 640–41 (quoting William S. Thompson’s testimony before the House Subcommittee in
the Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886).
312. Id. at 644 n.9.
313. Id. at 643 (“[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured
patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property without due process
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an individual does not even have a federal case and the Void is irrelevant.
The Court’s message in Florida Prepaid about state remedies is
dramatically different from a more general message about the availability of
state remedies when the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated. Florida
Prepaid fits into a line of cases that makes the availability of adequate state
remedies a decisive factor in deciding whether certain due process rights have
been violated. 314 Certainly, in thinking about the contours of what it might
mean for state remedies to be available at the Intersection, the focus of future
scholarship, this is one possible view. 315 Moreover, it is a view that is consistent
with protecting federalism, because Florida Prepaid did not hold that states
have to provide remedies. 316 And the anti-commandeering principle
presumably prevents the federal government from requiring states to provide
one. 317 All Florida Prepaid held is that if states do provide one, then there is
no constitutional violation. And the options for remedies are as diverse as the
states, eliminating any suggestion that states are compelled to provide certain
remedies or else. If Congress can successfully manage federal regulatory
schemes with the states’ cooperative participation under Article I’s respect for
“labs of experimentation” principle, it also can respect varying state remedies—
something it already does. For example, some states waive their immunity in
certain cases and other states do not. This is in-keeping with Dean Gerken’s
and other scholars’ observations that federal/state relations are much more
interwoven in today’s modern world. Thus, a state’s sovereignty is not
impugned when Congress enacts legislation to keep individuals from falling
into the Void by providing federal remedies, including money damages, when
states have chosen not to provide their own remedies.
Flip the Florida Prepaid coin, however, and Coleman comes up again. One
line in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Coleman deserves mention.
Specifically, with respect to the validity of the self-care provision of the FMLA
under Section 5, Justice Kennedy quotes Florida Prepaid and stresses that
result.”).
314. This line of cases begins with Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), a case involving a
prisoner’s lost hobby kit. Briefly, while Mr. Taylor was in segregation, prison officials negligently
misplaced a hobby kit he had ordered. Taylor sued under § 1983 alleging that his property had been taken
without due process. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that because the state provided
a post-deprivation remedy, Taylor did not suffer a constitutional violation. Similarly, Florida Prepaid did
not take College Savings Bank’s property when it infringed its patent because Florida provided an
adequate remedy. Understandably, in cases like Parratt where the state actor’s conduct is random and
unauthorized, only a post-deprivation remedy is possible.
315. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113 (1990).
316. For a persuasive argument that the “right to a remedy” should be a fundamental right under the
U.S. Constitution (as it is in most states), see Tracy A. Tomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the
Constraints of Due Process: The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2015).
317. But see AZAIA, supra note 9 (questioning whether the anti-commandeering principle applies).
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“ʻCongress . . . said nothing about the existence or adequacy of state
remedies.’” 318 Linking Coleman, which arguably is more like Hibbs (FMLA
and sex discrimination) but results in a decision that is more like Garrett (ADA
and disability discrimination), with Florida Prepaid is curious because Florida
Prepaid is radically different from all of the Section 5 cases. But this
observation should be taken quite seriously because it was followed with this
observation: “It follows that abrogating the States’ immunity from suits for
damages for failure to give self-care leave is not a congruent and proportional
remedy if existing state leave policies would have sufficed.” 319
Is the Court suggesting that the existence of state remedies means that
congruence and proportionality can never be met? Stated alternatively, does it
mean that Congress has no enforcement power if states provide a remedy? Not
even for actual violations? In Florida Prepaid, of course, the existence of state
remedies meant there was not even a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The
Coleman opinion does not go that far and the full import of this observation
needs to be explored.
Example of # 5 (successful abrogation): Congress’s successfully abrogated
states’ immunity in Hibbs and Lane, but neither majority opinion addressed
state remedies. It is possible for states to provide remedies and for Congress to
also successfully abrogate. This was the situation in Monroe, in fact. And even
if the Monroe message were to be modified to express the importance of state
remedies, such a shift would not necessarily mean that state remedies supplant
federal remedies. Still, the curious Coleman message that needs greater
exploration raises this possibility.
From the bigger picture perspective, as important as state sovereignty and
state sovereign immunity are, it simply violates the spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment to shield states from injuries they cause by allowing victims of
state action wrongdoing to fall into the Void. When states do protect
individuals, they deserve recognition for that. Additionally, a message from the
Court about the importance of state remedies would support its jurisprudence
at the Intersection and even strengthen it by encouraging and perhaps even
expecting states to play a significant role in protecting the important principles
embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores how the contemporary Court interprets Article I, and
the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to protect sovereignty and
318. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 39 (2012) (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527
U.S. at 644).
319. Id. at 38.
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federalism principles. The contemporary Court is providing meaningful and
substantive guidance with respect to drawing the boundary between Congress
and the states, particularly with respect to Congress’s Article I powers. Perhaps
the most curious part of this area of jurisprudence is that the Eleventh
Amendment, despite the havoc it has wreaked, nevertheless serves its purpose,
which is reflected in the broader Tenth Amendment principles. The Tenth
Amendment is a truism, but the current substantive meaning behind it reveals
what a truism it is!
With respect to drawing the boundary among Congress, the states, and the
individual under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Shield and the Void
loom large. Accordingly, the contemporary Court’s resurgence of and emphasis
on state sovereignty is an invitation to explore the positive role states can and
should play in protecting individual rights. A message from the Court in support
of this invitation would be consistent with, and even fortify, its overall message
about the importance of states in the constitutional design. The late Justice
Brennan, a self-avowed supporter of federalism, also believed that states play
an ever-increasingly important role in protecting human liberty, particularly as
it becomes more difficult to secure federal remedies. In his words: “[T]he very
premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to
the . . . [states] . . . to step into the breach.” 320 For those who strongly support
state sovereignty, and for those who strongly support individual liberties, this
Article suggests that both goals can be met if a jurisprudence about the positive
role of states under the Fourteenth Amendment is developed.

320. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503. Justice Brennan was talking specifically about the role of state
courts in interpreting state constitutions to protect human liberty. This Article calls on states to exercise
their various powers—legislative, judicial, executive—to mitigate the federal Void.
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APPENDIX: DIAGRAM OF THE FEDERAL TARGET
ZONE 3: ARTICLE 1 “RIGHTS”

ZONE 3: ARTICLE 1 “RIGHTS”

ZONE 2: ENFORCEMENT
STATUTORY “SHADOW
RIGHTS”

ZONE 1:
CONSTITUTIONAL
“RIGHTS”
B (heightened review)

B (heightened review)

A (rational basis
review)

Relationship
Zone1A-Zone 2

Primary
10th Amendment (StatesIndividual)

Zone 1B-Zone 2

14th Amendment
(Individual-Court/ Congress)
Article 1
(Congress-States)

Zone 3

Secondary
14th Amendment
(States/IndividualsCourt/Congress)
10th Amendment
(States-Congress
Article 1
(Congress/States-Individual)
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